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Abstract 
Tanzania has continued to struggle to address poverty issues with a host of 
political, social and economic challenges since gaining its independence in 1961. To 
achieve this objective, the country has had to overcome resource use challenges 
requiring dexterity and intelligence in terms of governance. The extent of the resource 
curse is great, now, especially with regard to the gemstones and Tanzanite. The mining 
sector has experienced large-scale ‘curses’ since independence. The fourth phase 
President, Jakaya Kikwete, who took over leadership in December 2005, came to office 
at the time when the resource curse was a real issue. He has been trying to put the 
house in order, which includes making a review of mining contracts, but the exercise 
seems to be arduous, being partly due to the complex nature of corruption and abuses 
of power.   
This paper intends to take a look at examples of the resource curse. Many of the 
‘curses’ discussed refer to the mining industry from 1985 to 2006. This, however, does 
not mean that there was no resource ‘curse’ from the 1960s to the 1980s. The 
resource curse was there, but was controllable to a large degree - and causes were, in 
the main, poorly implemented policies, which came via a wieldy bureaucracy; and they 
were also due, in part, to the failures of the socialist system (existing in the 1970s). The 
largest part of this paper refers to curses on the Tanzanite gemstone (constituting 
almost 75 percent of this Policy Paper (PP)). Tanzanite has been ‘hot news’ of late 
concerning the Al Qaeda link controversy. However, Tanzanite is not the only ‘cursed’ 
resource in Tanzania - for gold is ‘cursed’, too. Issues discussed include the deepening 
of vested interests and, also, a laxity when it comes to collecting revenues; there have 
also been dubious contracts that the government had signed with investors under 
confidential arrangements.  
A lack of integrity and abuses of power continue to hit the process of governance 
building hard, especially in the context of key decision- and contract-making processes. 
The overseeing role of Parliament - keeping an eye on the activities of the executive 
and holding them accountable on behalf of the citizen - is open to ridicule, which is in 
part due to the existing political environment. Propagating democratic governance 
would seem to be an uneasy task, as powerful and self-interested economic actors 
gain control over the executive department, to their own advantage, meaning that there 
are then enormous losses for the entire society. Powerful "oligarchs" buy off politicians 
and bureaucrats, to make them ‘twist’ laws, budgets, projects, and policy and 
regulatory environments to favor their own interests. Experts say that the majority of 
parliamentarians, especially from the ruling party, are often no more than ‘a rubber 
stamp’, approving defective executive’s plans. Political stability, which Tanzania has 
had since independence, misleads external partners as regards the realities of 
democracy and the degree of correct resource governance. 
 This paper thus gives some clues as to why Tanzania, with its numerous 
resources, ‘is poorer’. The paper contains a series of evidence-based poor governance 
cases to illustrate the degree of the problem and causes, giving insightful details into 
how different groups manipulate the system for their own individual gains. 
One of the most undeniable facts is that unless holistic integrity building is honestly 
implemented, the resource curse will continue to damage Tanzania’s economy. It is 
hoped that this paper, if it does not give a comprehensive solution to this problem, may 
provide a starting point if one wishes to seek out feasible options to address a resource 
curse that continues to damage Tanzania’s reputation. It will also serve to complement 
existing policy recommendations on ending the resource curse in Tanzania, and 
elsewhere. An agenda for change is part of this paper, giving a road map towards the 
installation of good governance systems. In the final section, the paper will provide a 
set of policy alternatives and strategies that can be made use of so as to reverse the 
situation. As part of the paper’s wider scope, experiences regarding the managing of 
resources by other countries have also been taken on board. 
 The study gives some answers to at least five questions. These are: Why is there a 
crisis in the Tanzanite industry? How and why has Tanzanite been linked to the Al 
Qaeda Group? Is it the Al Qaeda link that is ‘cursing’ Tanzanite, or is it just a syndicate 
of dealers (e.g. a Mafia group)? To what extent does poor governance as regards 
handling Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) contribute to the ‘curse’ of Tanzanite, 
alongside other minerals? Lastly, what might policy options be to address the problem 
as a whole? 
 The central hypothesis of this policy study is that “Poor Governance is the central 
cause of the Resource Curse.” It is hoped that the idea of fighting poor governance in 
the managing of resources - while ensuring that natural resources are well-managed so 
as to benefit the public - will reflect Tanzania’s commitment to the implementation of 
anti-poverty initiatives, including Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
This policy paper was produced under the 2006-07 International Policy Fellowship 
program. Sebastian Paschal Sanaga was a member of the ‘Combating the Resource 
Curse’ working group, which was directed by Michael Ross. More details of their policy 
research can be found at http://www.policy.hu/themes06/resource/index.html. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to look at the so-called ‘resource curse’ in Tanzania, 
see the nature of the problem and to provide a set of pro-poor policies that might 
address the dilemma in on-going efforts to deal with the problems facing the Tanzanite 
sector and the mining industry as a whole.  
 
Tanzania is wallowing in poverty, despite her abundant resources, especially 
minerals. It is over 40 years now since the country gained her independence from 
Britain, but it is harvesting little from investors in spite of her 20-plus years exercising 
an open market policy in the mining sector. For the sector, and the Tanzanite 
gemstone in particular, seems to be ‘cursed’. A while ago, it was alleged to be 
providing sustenance to the Al Qaeda terrorist group...  
 
This policy paper will introduce and discuss the nature and causes of the resource 
“curse” in Tanzania, focusing on the mining sector, and Tanzanite in particular. It raises 
arguments and gives both facts and examples of “resource curse” elements, having an 
emphasis on Tanzanite, the rare gemstone - which has had a major role to play in the 
country’s history. The problem affects society in different ways, and there are 
stakeholders who have different roles to play within the context of the problem, 
including Tanzania’s government, importing countries, miners, both small and big 
companies, middlemen who link up miners with retail sellers, etc… 
1.2 The Treasures of Tanzania  
Tanzania takes its name from the old colonial territory of Tanganyika and the 
islands of Zanzibar. It is home to around 37 million people. In terms of resource 
abundance, Tanzania ranks highly in Africa. From Africa's Lake Tanganyika to its 
highest peak, Mount Kilimanjaro, Tanzania is an undiscovered country, a land of wide-
open spaces and wildlife, of palm-fringed islands and turquoise seas, of a warm and 
hospitable people... Tanzania also lays claim to the continent's best wildlife viewing. It 
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has fascinating national parks, conservation areas and game reserves, which include 
the famous Serengeti and Ngorongoro Crater, covering nearly a quarter of the country; 
and it is home to an estimated twenty percent of Africa's largest mammals; and it has 
also been blessed with having vast natural resources, most of which are untapped and 
could be used to transform Tanzania into one of Africa's major production and 
distribution centers. Tanzania is also one of the most promising gemstone frontiers, 
with more than 50 varieties of gemstones having been identified to date
1
. Significantly, 
it is also the world's only source of Tanzanite. Besides Tanzanite, diamonds and gold, 
Tanzania can boast of having classified rubies, nickel, marble, phosphates, lead, iron 
ore, soda ash, coal and kaolin. In addition to these, reports by petroleum dealers have 
revealed the presence of oil reserves too. In terms of gold production, Tanzania is 
located third in Africa, after South Africa and Ghana.  
 
Yet it is also one of the poorest countries on earth.  Why is Tanzania poor? And is it 
really poor? This and other similar questions dwell in the minds of anti-poverty experts, 
who seek answers to establish the nature and causes of Tanzanian poverty. Over 18 
million of its people, almost 50 percent of the total population, are close to the verge of 
starvation. Tanzania has, generally, had an experience of poor revenue collection, 
especially when compared to other countries that possess natural resources - pointing 
to ‘the paradox of plenty’. The UN Human Development report puts Tanzania among its 
poorest member states. When it comes to minerals and the Tanzanite gemstone (in 
particular, for the latter is only available in Tanzania), Tanzania is rich – yet its current 
state could mean that it has on its hands a ‘poisoned gift’.  
 
First of all, though, this research paper needs to highlight the concept of the 
resource curse. 
1.3 The Concept of the Resource Curse  
Some neoclassical economists argue that natural resource abundance increases 
the risk of civil strife by producing weak states via a set of developmental pathologies 
known collectively as a ‘resource curse’. In general, there are different forms of 
                                            
1 
Tanzania’s opportunities for mineral resource development, Third Edition 1998: Ministry of Energy and 
Minerals  
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resource curse. They include resource abundance, which can be seen in the way a 
specific resource tends to contribute to economic stagnation in the long term via a 
number of crowding-out effects, that is, by shifting resources away from other sectors 
of the economy that have positive growth opportunities. In so doing, economic 
distortions set in and slow the maturing of non-resource tradable sectors, harm their 
competitiveness, and thereby inhibit several kinds of economic diversification. 
 
The second form comes via an over-reliance on exports of minimally processed 
natural resources, which can make a country vulnerable to declining terms of trade and 
the highly volatile nature of international commodities markets.
2
 For Tanzania, which 
does not have any stakes in mining firms, the resource curse comes in the form of 
neglect shown by the government with regard to its collecting revenue; and, also, poor 
governance in decision-making with regard to actually handling the sector. This has 
resulted in large-scale corruption and ‘lenient behavior’, which create loopholes for 
small and large-scale smuggling.  
 
The Socio-economic and environmental consequences of policy failures are 
reflected in a variety of ways, which are specified later, in more detail.  
1.4 A Description of Tanzanite 
Tanzanite is mined in the village of Merelani, in the northern part of Tanzania, near 
Mount Kilimanjaro. In US markets, Tanzanite is a top-selling gemstone. It is a purple-
brown crystal which, when superheated, turns into a beautiful, blue gem; and displays 
different colours - blue, purple, and bronze - when viewed from different directions. 
According to local legend, lightning struck in the vicinity of the Merelani hills, and set 
the surrounding grasslands on fire. When the Maasai herders returned to the area with 
their livestock, magical blue stones had appeared on the ground. A Portuguese 
geologist, named DeSouza, travelled to this area in the 1960s and found this blue 
stone. He, in time, brought it to the attention of a marketing company, Tiffany & Co. 
When heated to 600 degrees Celsius, Tanzanite undergoes an incredible 
                                            
2
 (This is based on the International Council on Mining and Metals — “the resource curse is overstated” at 
www.icmm.com/newsdetail). 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 7 
metamorphosis, resulting in the creation of a vibrant blue/violet trichroic gemstone. The 
stone is traditionally called Zoisite, though this name was rejected by Henry Platt, the 
then president of the New York-based Tiffany and Company, for two reasons: that 
Zoisite does not reflect the host, which is Tanzania, the only country that produces it; 
and that the word Zoisite sounds like ‘suicide,’ which was not good for marketing 
purposes. Early in 1969 the gem was introduced onto the market, by the 
aforementioned company, for commercial purposes. The Maasai are also said to 
believe that Tanzanite is the stone of birth because of its blue colour, and they used to 
give it to their wives to have their first children - and this was the only way Tanzanite 
had been used until when Tiffany and Company began marketing it! Tanzanite was 
initially scattered in alluvial plains near the surface, but now it is found in deep mines… 
 
A good quality Tanzanite is second only to diamonds, but it is estimated to be 1000 
times rarer than a diamond. Now, Tanzanite is one of the newest and most popular 
stones in the mining industry, being a jewel with many colours, varieties and variations. 
In Merelani, over 45,000 people earn their incomes from Tanzanite. There are over 530 
brokers. About 14, 000 people were, until 2003, licensed to conduct mining operations 
in the village. The actual population of the village is not known, but reports say that it is 
among the most populated places in Tanzania. Rough Tanzanite sells at US$700 to 
US$800 per gramme on secondary markets, but, in Arusha, Tanzanite sells at between 
US$40 and US$400 a carat at a wholesale level, depending on the cut, color and 
overall quality of the stone and prevailing market conditions (see Business Times, May 
31, 2002 - or at Tucsonshowguide.com/stories/tanzanite.cfm). Its economic importance 
is not just for Tanzanians alone - it is also important for foreign countries, like India, 
where its processing has created jobs for over 250,000 people. Mike Nunn, an AFGEM 
Chief Executive (see below) once said that evidence from retailers, cutters and traders 
indicates that Tanzanite turns over between US$150 million to US$300 million a year 
wholesale - although others put estimates at over US$500 million in the United States 
alone. The amount of Tanzanite entering other countries - like India, the Republic of 
South Africa, Kenya, Germany, Thailand, Israel - is undervalued in most cases.     
 
 
 
Table 1:  Tanzanite: Production, Value and Royalties from 1996 to 2005 
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 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
LSM Kg 5.8   81.25 46.51 106.36 920.99 404.78 229.99 293 
Value in 
US$m 
0.00013   0.31 1.09 1.76 4.68 5.61 6.30  
SSM kg *1167.4 7960.72 1239 5418 5469.4
9 
10273 5539 4087 3651  
Value in 
US$m 
5.98 4.94 5.19 8.95  11.97 12.58 7.52 17.81  
Weight *1173.2 7960.72 1239 5228 5516 5473 6461 4490 3880 2000
0 
Total 
value, $m 
5.89 4.94 5.19 11.45 16.23 15.93 17.34 13 24 40 
Royalty in 
Tshsm 
     13.8 419.9 376.6 802.7 2,03
1 
Source: Merelani Controlled Area (Report by J. Nayopa: 2006) 
LSM kg: Large-scale Mining, kilogram                             SSM kg: Small-scale Mining, Kilogram 
* Needs verification 
 
Table 2: Other data relating to official Tanzanite Exports for the year 2001  
Country Weight Weight Value ($) Value ($) Total valued 
($) 
 Rough 
(gram) 
Cut & 
polished 
(Carat) 
Rough Cut & 
polished 
 
India 4,572,926.93 7,973.55 7,248,652.31 110,126.51 7,358,778.82 
US 145,073.84 47,350.11 714,259.09 3,242,594.98 3,956,854.07 
South Africa 36,082.51 2,865.88 1,980,787.52 315,248.51 2,296,036.03 
Germany 96,507.25 2,642.30 304,963.16 258,662.50 563,625.66 
Thailand 85,604.56 4,580.24 159,305.10 259,361.85 418,666.95 
Israel 15,897.40 1,224.30 158,976.85 86,903.00 245,879.85 
Other 498,897.51 44,418.00 596,869.97 489,405.05 1,086,275.02 
Total 5,450,990 111,054.38 11,163,814.00 4,762,302.40 15,926,116.40 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Minerals 
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CHAPTER 2 
2.1 The Al Qaeda Connection Controversy   
Apart from causing hatred among miners, wreaking havoc among politicians, 
bringing suffering to the people and causing major unrest among the local population, 
the gemstone has now become associated with this ‘curse’, namely that it was 
allegedly being made use of by the notorious Al Qaeda network. In November 2001, 
the New York-based Wall Street Journal (WSJ) carried a negative story regarding the 
gemstone. The story came under the headline, “Much-smuggled gem (Tanzanite) aids 
Al Qaeda” with the sub-headline, “The gem is being bought and sold by militants near 
the mine.
3
 It said that the stone travels a long way from the dusty plains to US jewelry 
stores, and it passes through many hands on the journey - some of which belonged to 
active supporters of Osama Bin Laden. The authors, Robert Block and Daniel Pearl, 
from South Africa and the US respectively, said that trading takes place inside the 
mosque in the village of Merelani, where dealers are also taught about the importance 
of avenging the arrogance of America and of defending Afghanistan from US 
oppression; after prayers, the mosque becomes an open-air gem dealing area - where 
Sheikh Omari and other mosque leaders trade Tanzanite with small-scale miners. The 
story did not end there - it additionally explained that parts of the gemstone’s sales had 
been used by Osama to bomb the USA embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, and 
also the World Trade Centre (WTC) and Pentagon in the USA. Then, a death lawsuit 
was filed by the wife of Cantor Fitzgerald, a New York police officer and father of a New 
York firefighter, against Tanzanite dealers. It was filed in the Federal Court in 
Manhattan on February 14, 2002. There was an injunction to ban New York dealer STS 
jewellers Inc. from selling Tanzanite, and it made the company donate past Tanzanite 
proceeds to September 11 relief funds; the suit also sought $1 billion in compensation 
from several other defendants, including the Tanzania Mineral Dealers Association 
(TAMIDA) - for it was alleged that TAMIDA knew that their Tanzanite sales supported 
Al Qaeda’s terrorism, and the suit wanted the court make TAMIDA pay money to the 
September 11 victims. TAMIDA won the case in the end, though. 
   
                                            
3 Wall Street Journal November 16, 2001 
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2.2 The Origin of the Troubles 
EL HAGE: The controversy started during a terrorism trial relating to some business 
done in the mid-1990s with a Kenyan named Mohamed Ali Oudeh. Ali Oudeh, who 
traded in gems and other consumer products, referred to Tanzanite in court when he 
was testifying in a case against Wadih El Hage. Also, the recent reference to the 
Tanzanite-Al Qaeda connection can also be traced to the 1998 trial of Wadih El Hage, 
a Lebanese-born resident of Arlington, near Dallas. Prosecution authorities described 
him as Bin Laden's personal secretary. El Hage was sentenced to life imprisonment 
after being convicted of conspiracy in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania. Reports indicate that El Hage had once travelled to Europe and 
the United States in the mid-1990s, trying to sell Tanzanite.  Professional Jeweller 
Magazine (PJM) says El Hage had trouble making ends meet while living in Kenya and 
tried to enter the Tanzanite business, but he failed (www.professionaljewer 
.com/archives/articles/2002). Court transcripts and interviews with Ali Oudeh, who was 
called up as a witness for the defence, affirm that El Hage had a lack of capital. His 
attempts to sell Tanzanite in Europe and the US were, according to investigations by 
the FBI, dismal.
4
 Indeed, he had to borrow 70 British pounds just to complete his trip! 
Joshua L. Dratel, El Hage’s attorney, says there is no evidence to show that Mr. El 
Hage could have received money as payment for Tanzanite that would then be 
used/transferred for terrorism or illegal activity purposes. Court decisions and findings 
by the FBI and CIA, from February 2002, meant that the US State Department finally 
agreed to clear things up, and it was agreed that there had not been a Tanzanite-Al 
Qaeda connection or ties with the events of Sept. 11. Bombings of the Tanzania and 
Kenya US embassies took place on August 7, 1998.  Over 4000 people were injured, 
and 257 were killed in simultaneous car bomb explosions at the United States 
embassies in the East African capital cities of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, 
Kenya. The attacks, linked to local members of the Al Queda terrorist network headed 
by Osama bin Laden, brought bin Laden and Al Qaeda to international attention for the 
first time, and resulted in the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation placing bin Laden on 
its ‘Ten Most Wanted list.’  
                                            
4
 WIKIPEDIA Encyclopedia (http://enwikipedia.org/wiki/1998). 
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HARUN FAZUL: It is true that Al Qaeda has had some success in recruiting East Africans 
for guerrilla operations with trans-national objectives. These operations have primarily been to 
attack U.S. interests. According to the Terrorism Mirror Nov. 2003, the leader of Al Qaeda in 
East Africa, Harun Fazul (or Fazul Abdullah Mohammed), a native of the Comoro Island with 
dual citizenship in Kenya, is a ‘registered’ terrorist. Fazul was a ringleader in the 1998 East 
African embassy bombings and other attacks in the region; and he has been a member of Al 
Qaeda since the early '90s. Literature says that Fazul has been lying low for some time, 
somewhere in East Africa. Well educated and with technologically abilities, he is also 
apparently a ‘hip’ character, so can easily move among secular types.
5
  It is alleged that Fazul 
used to team-up with local people when seeking to bomb places/carry out terrorism activities in 
the region.  
KHALFAN GHAILAN: A Tanzanian held in connection with the US embassy bombing in 
Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, Mr. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, has apologized to the victims of the 
1998 attack (see: allafrica.com/stories/2007036260549.html). Mr. Ghailani, along with his 
Uzbek wife, was arrested in Pakistan in July 2004 and was handed over to the US at the 
beginning of 2005. He took an Uzbek wife in Pakistan or Afghanistan and has got children. 
Many Uzbek separatists have moved into Pakistan - and the woman is thought to be from this 
group. There are no more details about the wife, but Ghailani was one of the detainees 
transferred in September from secret CIA prisons abroad to the Guantanamo Bay prison camp 
in Cuba. The press and the BBC in particular have reported that the transcript of the closed-
door hearing in March 2007 indicates that Mr. Ghailani has admitted delivering the explosives 
used to blow up the US embassy in Tanzania in 1998 (see: 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/3938267.stm).    
 
Born between 1970 and 1974 on the Tanzanian Island of Zanzibar, Ghailani is said to have 
bought the truck that carried the bomb that was used in the Dar es Salaam US embassy 
attack, in which 11 people died and several others were seriously injured. However, Ghailani 
said he did not know about the attack beforehand and apologized to the US government and 
the victims’ families. According to the US transcript, Mr. Ghailani admitted visiting an Al Qaeda 
training camp in Afghanistan after being indicted in 1998. In May 2003, the FBI placed Ghailani 
on a list of seven people suspected of concocting a fresh Al Qaeda plot, and increased the 
bounty on his head to $5m. Yet Ghailani denies being a member of Al Qaeda. Wikipedia 
reports that Ghailani had served as a tabligh, a Muslim traveling preacher, and probably visited 
Pakistan in this capacity. Quoting convicted fellow embassy bombing conspirators, Mohammed 
Sadiq Odeh and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Wikipedia says that after joining Al Qaeda, 
                                            
5
 Terrorism Mirror, Nov. 2003 
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Ghailani became an explosives expert and was given the job of obtaining bomb components in 
Dar es Salaam. Up to now, there has been no mention of Ghailani’s being connected with the 
Tanzanite trade, but with diamonds. Soon after the capture of Ghailani and others with him, the 
Boston Globe, quoting a United Nations source, said that Ghailani was one of several Al 
Qaeda personnel who had been in Liberia around 2001, handling conflict diamonds under the 
protection of the then-dictator Charles Taylor (Boston Globe, 4 August 2004: Liberia’s Taylor 
gave aid to Al Qaeda, UN probe finds, also see http:// 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed_Khalfan_Ghailani).  
MDIIR SULEIMAN: More work is needed to establish the fact of a direct link between Al 
Qaeda and the Tanzanite industry – and this brings us to Mr. Mudiir Omar Suleman.  From the 
Taqwa mosque at Mererani, its leader, Mudiir Omar Suleiman, was said to be a main 
character linking up with Osama's group in the village. Until June 2002, Taqwa had 
seven Imams and there were about 270 male believers (while the number of women 
was not established during this investigation). At Mererani, the AMYC was established 
in 1998. AMYC and the Taqwa Mosque are institutions promoting the welfare of 
Muslims, and it was established that Omar is a Ansar Sunna Muslim. He used to head 
the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC). He was born in 1974 and had a religious 
primary and secondary education. He has a university education in religion, which took 
him to the Uganda Islamic University. He completed his studies in 1996. His profession 
is preaching. Before joining the AMYC, he was employed by the Alharamin Islamic 
Foundation (AIF), where he worked from 1999 to 2001.  When the article linking 
Tanzanite with Al Qaeda was published, Omar was also head of an English Medium 
and Nursery Centre, one owned by the AMYC. While Mererani dwellers are Maasai, 
Omar himself is not - he is from the Nyaturu tribe, from the Singida Region of central 
Tanzania. His parents had settled in the village of Mererani several years before. He 
refutes the Al Qaeda-Tanzanite link report, and has said he has never met Robert 
Block or the late Daniel Pearl, the authors of the WSJ story on the Tanzanite-Al Qaeda 
link. As to why he was alleged to be linked with Al Qaeda he had this to say: "I cannot 
say exactly why. It could be because of our faith. We believe that the Taleban are 
faithful people and that they follow Holy teachings. It is possible that it was due to our 
religious clothes and our lifestyle, which makes us look like Talebans (…) It is possible, 
also, that the writer wanted to win an award from the US government for unveiling 
members of Al Qaeda. I additionally think that the one idea behind this might be to 
paralyze the Tanzanite industry, under the directives of some competitors in the 
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industry, investors who dislike small traders…" Omar had initially written a letter to the 
WSJ, refuting the allegations made against him; and he then tried to get legal 
assistance so as to sue the publication - but did not manage to.  
While it needs thorough reasoning and data to establish whether there was some possibility 
of an Al Qaeda-Tanzanite link, it is clear that Kenya and Tanzania - as is the case with other 
East African countries - have been prone to attacks by Al Qaeda in recent years.  
 
HOTEL BOMBERS IN MOMBASSA: In November 2002, Al Qaeda conducted a hotel 
bombing in Mombassa, Kenya, where more than a dozen people were killed at the Israeli-
owned ‘Paradise’ Hotel. Minutes before the hotel bombing was an unsuccessful attempt to 
shoot down an Israeli airliner with a shoulder-held, surface-to-air missile. Of special interest are 
two Mombassa-born Kenyans, Ahmad Salim Swedan and Salah Ali Salah Nabhan, who had 
both been indicted in the U.S. for having had leading roles in the 1998 bombing; and they were 
suspected of having planned the 2002 attacks. Nabhan is now believed to be living in 
Mogadishu. Kenyan security officials claim that Al Qaeda is active in the country only through 
infiltrators from Somalia, the ‘stateless’ country.  
 
ALLEGATIONS OVER INVESTMENTS: According to an article, Tanzania: Al Qaeda’s East 
Africa Beachhead by Power and Interest, News Draft Report  (http://www.pinr.bios.php), 
Erich Marquardt, the author (who is identified as being a private sector expert on militant Islam, 
and who made an investigative trip to Tanzania) explained that there has been growing 
concern that extremists’ influences from Sudan and Saudi Arabia have been imported in 
Tanzania, and that these are serving to dangerously radicalize indigenous religious beliefs and 
their sense of moderation. Most attention has been focused on Zanzibar, both on account of its 
great Islamic population and the fact that the semi-autonomous province has not (relatively-
speaking) enjoyed the same rate of economic growth and social development as has been 
evident on the Tanzania mainland. At least two Al Qaeda operatives have been identified as 
originating from the island - Khalfan Khamis Muhammad, one of those convicted in connection 
with the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and Qaed Sanyan al-
Harithi, a suspected East African point man for bin Laden, who was killed in Yemen in 2001 by 
a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drone. Fingers have been pointed at Oilcom (a Saudi-
based petroleum company), The African Muslim Agency (a Kuwaiti organization engaged in the 
construction of mosques, schools and hospitals) and the CIFA Development Group (a joint 
Tanzanian-Saudi investment venture established in 1995).
6
 For example, the International 
                                            
6 
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Millennium Declaration Development Goals Zanzibar Report, of 18 March 2002, quotes one 
regional commentator as saying that the activities of Oilcom, a Saudi company, mean that at 
least US$1 million is moved each year into Tanzania, nothing of which is taxed. The author 
suspected that at least some of this money was going towards arms purchases as well as 
being used in the bribing of corrupt members of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), i.e. to 
turn a blind eye to imported Wahabist proselytizing. There have been an exacerbating of British 
and American concerns in the last few years via a spate of violent incidents that have included 
armed takeovers of moderate mosques in Dar es Salaam as well as the 2002 firebombing of a 
tourist bar in Stone Town, Zanzibar.  
 
A TANZANITE-AL QAEDA LINK RULED OUT: Despite these speculative reports, analysts 
and researchers along with the FBI and CIA have now come to the conclusion that the 
Tanzanite industry has had no connection with the Al Qaeda group, and this after 
intensive investigations involving different groups had occurred. The exercise ended up 
by convening the Tanzania Summit meeting in February 9, 2002, in the USA, which 
Tanzania’s and the United States’ governments attended as well as other industry 
figures. The deliberations of the summit reads: “While it is now confirmed that there is 
no evidence to support allegations of an on-going connection between trade in 
Tanzanite and smuggling to support terrorism, we abhor the mere possibility of such a 
link and believe that recently published allegations warrant action to restore confidence 
in Tanzanite.” Unfortunately there was no major analysis to establish the cause of the 
allegations, i.e. which could have been used to come up with some form of ‘counter-
action’. If the linking of Tanzanite with Al Qaeda was a concocted story, who might the 
agenda behind this be? Is this all part of the ‘resource curse’? 
 
We shall now take a look at the sector itself, and its problems. 
2.3 Problems Afflicting the Sector 
There are multiple perspectives on the Tanzanite ‘curse’. There are many actors 
playing specific roles here (so often contradictory and clashing), within a crisis situation 
that has seen poor governance and corruption (for decades), the deaths of miners, 
denial of government revenues, etc. At the centre of the saga are, in the main, small 
and large mining firms and middlemen; and then exporters, processors and 
governments (of countries getting the exports): India, United States, Kenya, Germany, 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 15 
Thailand, Israel, Japan, and other European and Asian countries. Of course, they also 
include international donors. Locally, it is the government/politicians and related 
institutions who have their roles, each with a vested interest in the sector; and, of 
course, miners, mining industry officials and other involved persons come into conflict, 
too - as such parties strive to defend their interests… 
2.4 Background to the Problem 
In 1971, under the first president, the late Julius Nyerere, Tanzania had a 
nationalization program, whereby private investors and foreign firms were driven out of 
Merelani. The government gave the mine to its own parastatal, Tanzania Gemstones 
Industries Limited (TGL), which was under the National Development Corporation 
(NDC). Then, in 1973, TGL was put under the State Mining Corporation (STAMICO). 
The mine was under the auspices of TGI up to 1987. A report by the Arusha Small 
Miners’ Association (AREMA) said that the essence of the crisis at Merelani, from 
Graphtan to AFGEM, indicates that at different times the company did try to obtain 
foreign partners, though in vain. One foreign partner did come (though later on), a Ray 
Ferguson – but he was repatriated, in 1982, for security reasons - six months after he 
had begun mining operations at Merelani. 
 
THE ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRACY: When the government’s TGI was operating 
at Merelani, illegal mining was rampant, involving different players and large-scale 
smuggling. Much of the smuggled Tanzanite was exported to Kenya. TGI was weak 
both financially and technically; and it failed to have any control over either smugglers 
or illegal mining. Smuggling increased because illegal miners and buyers were afraid of 
selling their Tanzanite nearby, in the town of Moshi, where TGI had its offices, because 
miners and buyers had no licenses, and it was difficult to get them (bureaucracy was 
one of the factors causing this difficulty). The other factor that saw Tanzanite going to 
Kenya was the lack of commodities or foreign currency in Tanzania; so miners sold 
their gems in Kenya, from where they could then return with cheap commodities. The 
selling of Tanzanite in Kenya greatly helped dealers, especially foreigners, to obtain 
foreign currencies and to transfer them abroad (for in those days it was illegal in 
Tanzania to hold or transfer foreign currency).  
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PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT: In 1985, when Tanzania's ex-president Ali 
Hassan Mwinyi took over from Nyerere, the government decided that Merelani should 
be divided into segments, and that private companies would be allowed to own ‘plots’, 
of which there were four. Plot A went to Kilimanjaro Limited, B to Building Utilities, C to 
Tsavo Mining Inc., and D to the Arusha Small Miners’ Association (AREMA). AREMA 
decided to form its own company, AREMA Enterprises Limited, to oversee the divisions 
and to locate the areas its members. Things, however, were not so easy for AREMA. In 
1994, conflicts erupted between AREMA and its members simply because their leaders 
formed a dubious joint venture with another firm, the TUCKMAN Company, without 
consulting members. To solve this problem, AREMA's plot was divided among 
individuals. Unfortunately, the ‘small miners’ had no capital and policy was not clear 
regarding how to ‘empower’ them in this regard. In 1992, the small miners then wanted 
a certain investor, Mr. Misha Fainzilber, to reduce his area (B) so as to increase plot 
D,
7
 and decided to take over his plot. Invasions occurred again in 1995, when Building 
Utilities lost its ownership of the plot, and it decided to sue the government for taking 
the plot. In the same year, the company changed its mind and decided to make a 
compromise out of court. Its area was reduced, in 1996, so that the remaining portion 
could be allocated to small miners. For security reasons, the license to a plot belonging 
to Tsavo Mining Inc. was revoked, and TGI took it back.  
 
A LEAD INVESTOR GETS A LOAN: Given its inherent weakness in terms of 
capital and know-how, TGI started to look for partners to invest in its plot. In 1989, they 
managed to organize a joint venture investment with a UK firm, SAMAX, and African 
Gems Limited from Kenya. On March 8, 1991, the three partners decided to form a 
joint company, and named it Graphtan Limited. Graphtan got a licence (No.8/92) on 
August 4, 1992, to mine Tanzanite and graphite. Yet African Gems Limited was 
removed from having share ownership, and its shares were bought by SAMAX. After 
the sale, SAMAX owned 90 percent and TGI, the government part, had 10 percent of 
shares. At some time in 1992, Graphtan Limited applied for a mining license, for a 
period of 25 years, to exploit all minerals at Merelani. So as to increase operations, the 
company at different times acquired loans from three financial Institutions - the African 
                                            
7
 Seminar report for the Parliamentary Committee for the Tanzanite sector April 5/2002 submitted by the 
Ministry of Energy and Minerals  
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Development Bank (ADB) (about US$4,483,000), the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) 
(about US$1,785,000) and Tanganyika Development Finance Limited (TDFL) (about 
ECUs 835,860).  
 
INVESTOR FAILS TO REPAY THE LOAN: Despite having secured loans, the 
company did not boost its investments, so failed to repay the loans, which prompted 
creditors to place Graphtan under receivership in mid-1998. An international auditing 
firm, KPMG, which is in the network of the DENVERGOLD GROUP of Canada, was 
contracted to collect the debt. KPMG began looking for investors and it announced the 
sale of the Graphtan block and the assets. An advert - "An Investment Opportunity – A 
Graphite/Tanzanite Mine in Tanzania" - was placed in international journals, namely the 
Mining Journal of August 1998 and the Engineering Mining Journal of September 1998, 
both from England. The advert, however, did not appear in any local media in 
Tanzania. The transparency aspect was being ignored. This marked the beginning of 
the on-going, major conflicts between Tanzanian gem dealers and the new investor in 
plot C. The end of submissions for bids to buy the mine was fixed for October 15, 1998. 
The process of inviting investors missed one of the most important elements of good 
governance: transparency in handling such transactions. This is, in part, because the 
government had its own stake in the company – it was holding them on behalf of the 
public; yet this denied the rights of local dealers and other stakeholders to participate, 
while Members of Parliament could not monitor the transaction processes.  
 
FIRST CONTROVERSY: A few weeks after the announcement, Merelani Mining 
Limited (MML) was formed by KPGM officials, and Graphtan’s assets were taken over 
by the new firm – and this was the second dubious deal. A meeting was held in Nairobi, 
on June 30, 1999, to look into the case. At this meeting, there was another company 
from South Africa, African Gem Resources Limited (AFGEM). Major contracts were 
signed in this particular meeting that involved banks (creditors) and MML (above). 
AFGEM was a third party to the agreement. AFGEM was a guarantor of the 
transaction, and MML had the role of controlling all assets and also Graphtan’s license 
and plot. KPMG officials and liquidators became investors in MML.
8
 Registration details 
indicate that the company changed its name three times in eight months, which pointed 
                                            
8
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to a contentious deal (it was registered as Mererani Mining Limited on October 22, 
1998; then on November 10, 1999 the company was re-registered as Mirerani Mining 
Limited; then it changed itself, on January 21, 1999, into Mererani Mining Limited 
again; and, finally, it was, on June 24, 1999, Merelani Mining Limited).  
 
SECOND CONTROVERSY: Technically, the transfer of shares and assets from 
Graphtan to AFGEM not only did away with the openness factor - it also ignored legal 
procedures, bearing in mind that the government had shares in the firm. The firm’s 
movements were not overseen by competent and authorized bodies, the Privatization 
Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) or the Loans Advances and Realization Trust 
(LART); for the PSRC is responsible for the privatizing of government assets, while 
LART was formed by the government
9
 to handle non-performing assets in the form of 
debts and issues involving debt recovery - so the deal, i.e. the government's approval 
of the transfer of Graphtan assets, had been handled in an unnecessarily quick manner 
(which led to suspicions of corruption). The former Minister for Minerals and Energy, Dr 
Abdallah Kigoda, is reported to have approved the share transfer on July 1, 1999, just 
one day after an endorsement of sales agreements had been signed in Nairobi. The 
approval was made with major speed therefore - it was endorsed just one day after in 
Nairobi. The license was issued on the same day, without consulting the PSRC to 
determine the government’s shares – indeed, it was not known who actually owned the 
government shares in the new firm. Both SAMAX and the Minister for Energy and 
Minerals had used loopholes existing in the Mining Act of 1998… Under this Act, a 
mineral rights holder is free to transfer his property to a third party. Of course, 
ministerial consent is required only where interest is shown in a special mining license, 
though the consent cannot be unreasonably denied. For under the currently existing 
Mining Act, the Minister has discretional powers - which allows for dubious deals (See 
Mining Legislation - Basic Principles, presented on 16 October 2003 by MNR & 
Advocates).   
 
THIRD CONTROVERSY: The worse part of the process was the liquidation of 
Graphtan - and it is not clear whether SAMAX was really bankrupt, or whether it was 
                                            
9
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just a hoax. Suspicions are that SAMAX, which had 90 percent of shares in the 
liquidated firm, had merely pretended to be bankrupt. Up until March 21
st
, 2002, 
SAMAX was still operating in other areas of Tanzania 
("http://www.denvergold.org/members/samax.htm"). The company went into the Tabora 
region of north-western Tanzania to develop the Golden Pride Project in the Nzega 
greenstone belt, where it discovered and owned 50 percent of the Golden Pride 
deposit. (This deposit was among the largest gold mines in Tanzania.) Early in 1998, 
SAMAX Gold Inc. announced the discovery of the Kukuluma and Matandani deposits, 
north-east of the Geita deposits. It appears, also, that SAMAX had started its hunt for 
gold perhaps in the mid- or early 1990s; and it is possible that this occurred 
immediately after having obtained bank loans. Generally, the takeover of block C by 
AFGEM/MML did not go down well with the public because the transaction was not, in 
great part, handled in a transparent way. 
2.4.1 A Deepening Brawl    
Poor governance in relation to the transfer of Graphtan shares to AFGEM continued 
to wreak havoc in the sector. The Tanzanite-Al Qaeda link controversy can be traced or 
connected to the on-going conflicts between AFGEM and the small miners. Lacking 
blessings from the public and some MPs, AFGEM, which had operations at block C 
(containing two thirds of the Tanzanite stock), was seen to have acquired the block in 
an incorrect way. The company was thus surrounded by unfriendly miners, though not 
by unfriendly government executive officials. 
 
On April 15, 2001 a home-made petrol bomb was thrown into AFGEM’s processing 
plant. No one was hurt. Two weeks later, on April 28, 2001, an artisanal miner was shot 
dead in an incident where small-scale miners were throwing stones into AFGEM’s 
property. According to the small miners, it was AFGEM security that opened fire, yet 
the company denies this. Following major conflicts between AFGEM and other miners, 
in July 2001 its manager, Joel Kimble, wrote a letter to the Arusha Regional 
Commissioner saying that a group of people, dealers and politicians, were sabotaging 
AFGEM’s activities to try to make them leave the country (Daily Mirror, weekly 
2001/01/08). His claim was supported by East African newspapers, which carried a 
story alleging that an Indian businessman from Jaipur (where there are several 
Tanzanite cutting and polishing plants) had invested US$250,000 into lobbying 
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Members of Parliament to vote for the removal of AFGEM, and which would pay 
journalists to write inflammatory articles, reward small-scale miners for invading the 
company’s property and procure small arms and petrol bombs (mining weekly 2001). 
Such allegations brought a new dimension to the way the conflict was being perceived 
by dealers and other observers.  
 
On April 20, 2001, a group of claim-holders and Tanzanite dealers filed a case 
against AFGEM with the Supreme Court of Tanzania. The case challenged the 
company’s mining license, tax record, attitudes toward small-scale competitors and its 
alleged moves to monopolize the Tanzanite market in the world; the case also 
challenged the former Minister of Energy and Minerals for granting a special license to 
AFGEM to mine block C. However, the case was dismissed by the Supreme Court in 
August 2001, on technical grounds. The Chief Justice said that allegations by the 
petitioners, such as the killings and beatings of small miners – said to have been 
carried by AFGEM officials - were a criminal matter rather than a constitutional one and 
would require a different type of lawsuit; and suing a minister in person was not 
appropriate because the minister was a government employee.
10
 Since then, the 
government would appear to have failed to solve the conflict - though small miners 
continue to blame the state for failing to abide by its own regulations.  
2.4.2 AFGEM and the Share Ownership Controversy    
AFGEM started operations in 2001, after investing US$17 million in the industry. 
Shareholders are not clearly defined, for the provided list is difficult to understand - but 
its does include the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) of South Africa and the 
African Development Bank (ADB). In other documents, a list of shareholders shows 
that approximately 36 percent of the shares are held by management; while the IDC 
held 23 percent by way of a pooling agreement. The remainder - 41 percent - goes to 
institutional shareholders and private individuals. The Tanzanian shareholders are not 
clearly stated, either; though persons appearing as directors are Henry Nyiti, 
Ambassador Ami Mpungwe, Laurent Masha and Sadock Magai. Henry Nyiti, an 
Arusha-based local businessman, had charged AFGEM in court with ‘forging’ his 
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signature in order to facilitate concealment from the registrar of companies, which case 
has not yet been solved.  
 
One of the above, Ambassador Ami Mpungwe, a retired Tanzanian Ambassador to 
South Africa (after having spent 25 years in the diplomatic service) decided to come 
back to Tanzania; and the reasons for his retirement are not clearly known - but he has 
been a board member with several South African firms that have invested in Tanzania. 
Mpungwe was once awarded the Order of Good Hope by SA President Thabo Mbeki 
for his key role in the South Africa-Tanzania relationship. As far as AFGEM is 
concerned, Mpungwe’s position is high-up - he has been involved in AFGEM’s 
management and community relations, and actively led the company’s development in 
Tanzania. He has been chairman of the company’s Tanzania subsidiary for several 
years. It is not known how many shares he had in the company, although the Business 
Day publication (South Africa) once reported that Mpungwe had sold his shares in the 
Tanzanite mine, to AFGEM, for 19 million Rand.
11
 The number of shares he had was 
not clearly stated either, but other records indicate that he had 15 percent. It is also 
unclear when he actually acquired those shares, in part because records of his position 
in AFGEM have always identified him as a non-executive director – though this is a 
contradiction in terms, for he was one of the shareholders.    
 
And there are also Laurent Masha and Sadock Magai, both of whom are Tanzanian 
lawyers. They have a law firm called IMMM - Ishengoma, Masha, Mujuluzi & Magai 
(advocates). One of the contradicting issues here is that, like Ambassador Mpungwe, 
Masha and Magai are also referred to as being non-executive directors. Based on 
records, Masha’s share amount is not known, yet Magai had 25 percent of shares in 
the AFGEM on behalf of Tanzanians.
12
 If the amount here excludes Mpungwe’s 
shares, the number of shares held by Tanzanians would add up to 40 percent. Yet 
neither Mpungwe nor Sadock were on record as being executive directors of the 
company, which fact explains in part how complicated the issue is and the way 
personalities are strategically taken on board to defend the interests of investors.  
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PENETRATION STRATEGIES: The mobilization of political and diplomatic support, 
including from donor agencies, is one of the strategies used by some investors – and a 
common characteristic is that persons will find a well-placed, local middleman who will 
champion their crusade. They have a tendency to appoint directors from among retired 
government officials, political cadres and outstanding professionals (like lawyers, 
mainly for defence purposes), which ensures that dealings will be quick - and in their 
favor - in connection with public institutions, tax exemption claims, tenders and 
contracts. 
 
THE PROBE TEAM REPORT: The report by the Probe Team on reasons for the 
endless crisis in the Tanzanite industry makes some interesting observations. Magai 
had been holding shares in AFGEM in the form of a Trust; and interviewed lawyers, 
including from the Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team (LEAT), say that Magai 
seemed to being holding shares on behalf of persons whose names, given their 
positions, cannot be disclosed. Such ‘concealed’ persons could well be prominent 
ministers, or perhaps the prime minister or the president! Yet it is difficult to uncover 
names as the involved persons may appoint relatives or friends to ‘stand in’ for their 
interests/shares – which fact will complicate the task of junior officers or ministers when 
dealing with investors. For example, the former Prime Minister, Frederick Sumaye, had 
once differed with his Minister of Energy and Minerals, Edgar Majogo about AFGEM. 
Majogo had threatened to take stern measures against AFGEM - including revoking its 
license - on the grounds that the company was in breach of fair competition rules, 
following its (AFGEM’s) decision to brand Tanzanite; the minister also claimed that the 
company was involved in concocting the story that had linked Tanzanite with Al Qaeda. 
Yet in one of his public meetings, Sumaye defended the company.
13
 (See: Majira 
newspaper of March 1, 2002 and March 8, 2002).  
 
VESTED INTERESTS: So-called ‘big shots’ may have vested interests in AFGEM. 
One of the committee members assigned to look into the crisis at Mererani, Ealiachim 
Simpasa, had, in April 2002, told Parliament that at every stage of probing into the 
dealings of top persons in the Cabinet vested interests endeavored to complicate 
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things. This means that government shares could indeed have been taken over by 
individuals, perhaps top government officials. For example, AFGEM was quoted by 
Business Day on 23rd June 2004 as saying that it (AFGEM) had a majority stake in the 
world’s largest Tanzanite mine, at Merelani in Tanzania, where it operates in 
partnership with the Tanzanian government
14
. This implies that it had shares in the 
mine, which the government did not want to have revealed. The point is that, in May 
2004, AFGEM sold the mine to a group called Tanzanite One, which at the time had a 
22.8 percent stake in the mine. Tanzanite One is a subsidiary of JABE, a 
British/Australian company specializing in mining. With a new owner, though, it now 
becomes difficult to trace the government’s shares any more. Billions of shillings might 
have ended up in the pockets of individuals via this deal. Unfortunately, President 
Benjamin Mkapa and his Prime Minister, Sumaye, who were in power at the time of this 
saga, had never implemented recommendations arrived at by the probe committee 
after investigating issues – indeed, the government never made the report public! The 
report by the Committee’s Robert Mboma had raised queries over dubious deals in the 
sector - and proposed remedy measures. Mkapa vowed that his government would 
stick by the principles of “Transparency and Truthfulness,” though in terms of handling 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) - in the mining sector in particular - the opposite 
appears to be true.      
 
INTEGRITY IN JEOPARDY: A lack of transparency of procedure in relation to the 
transfer of Graphtan Mining Company shares - from SAMAX/the government to 
MML/AFGEM - has continued to threaten the integrity of Tanzania’s government. It has 
also deepened the enmity between the government, AFGEM and local investors 
(especially small-scale miners). Efforts to make the government more responsible in its 
dealings have failed, as dealers in the sector are divided, each having their own vested 
interests. This has created room for stakeholders to frame their own survival strategies, 
which could well have included certain notorieties, like a concocting of an article on the 
Tanzanite-Al Qaeda controversy - in which AFGEM appears (in a big way) among 
accused institutions (as indicated in the next section). 
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2.4.3 AFGEM Linked to the Tanzanite-Al Qaeda Story   
There have been serious allegations that a story linking Tanzanite with Al Qaeda 
was a fabricated one, i.e. having been cooked up by AFGEM so that it could displace 
locals and middlemen in the Tanzanite sector. The former Tanzanian Minister for 
Energy and Minerals, Edgar Maokola Majogo, condemned AFGEM for allegedly 
producing press reports linking Tanzanite with terrorism. “We have written evidence 
that you (AFGEM) invited the Wall Street Journal reporter Robert Block to Arusha, and 
then to the Tanzanite mining site at Merelani.”
15
 Majogo said that AFGEM was 
responsible for initiating the Wall Street Journal trip to Tanzania, and in some way 
AFGEM was a beneficiary of the WSJ’s unsubstantiated allegations that the Tanzanite 
trade was linked to terrorism. (Majogo was determined to find a solution to the 
Tanzanite crisis - though could not do so as the former President, Benjamin Mkapa, 
posted him to another ministry.) 
 
AFGEM SPEAKS: Evidence indicates that AFGEM did know in advance that 
Robert Block had plans to publish a story that Tanzanite produced and sold by small 
miners was linked with the Al Qaeda group. The company admitted that in August 2001 
AFGEM’s Johannesburg office was contacted by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), via Mr. 
Robert Block, an American (WSJ) correspondent based in South Africa. According to a 
press release of February 28, 2002 (responding to Minister Majogo), Block had 
informed AFGEM of his intention to write an article about alleged links between 
Tanzanite and Al Qaeda. AFGEM said that it considered Block’s suggestion with deep 
concern; and it provided Block with a standard press pack containing information about 
AFGEM. The statement read “We made every effort to dissuade Block from pursuing 
the article, recognizing that the WSJ had significant coverage in the United States - and 
that negative publicity, particularly relating to terrorism, would have a big and lasting, 
damaging effect on the industry.”
16
An opportunity to dissuade Block presented itself 
when, in October 2001, Block requested a visit to AFGEM’s mine block C, at Merelani 
(according to Joanne Herbstein, the then company’s Corporate Communications & 
Investment Relations officer). Block visited Merelani, and then wrote and published the 
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defamatory article… Local dealers in the sector say that as AFGEM had invited Block 
over, people could not say in advance – to either the government or others - what kind 
of story was being pursued. It was obvious that they had participated in events, though. 
Also, as Block was a reporter from South Africa, the home of AFGEM, it would have 
been easy to collude and publish the manipulative article. It is on this basis that local 
businesspersons say that AFGEM was involved in concocting the ‘new item’ as part of 
a plan to displace other (non-global) dealers in Tanzanite – i.e. it was one aspect of the 
company’s marketing strategy. 
2.4.4 Abuses of Market Powers by AFGEM  
AFGEM knew, in advance, not only opportunities existing in the Tanzanite industry 
but also the weaknesses of local businesses and Tanzania’s government; this had 
included failures to modernize or regulate the sector – which fact benefitted a company 
with global aspirations, for it the capital and technology; and it could easily displace 
local and middle dealers.   
 
Table 3: The Current Distribution of Mining Plots at Merelani  
Plot Area Owners Type of License 
A extension  1.8   sq. km. Kilimanjaro Mines Limited Prospecting License 
A 0.8   sq. km. Kilimanjaro Mines Limited Gemstone Mining 
License 
B 1.3   sq. km. Small miners 178 Primary Mining 
License 
C 2.3    sq. km. Tanzanite One/formerly 
AFGEM  
Special Mining 
License 
D-1 1.81  sq. km. Small Miners 331 Primary Mining 
License 
D-2 0.04  sq. km. Osoit Pusu Limited Gemstone mining 
License 
D-3 0.003 sq. km. Gem & Rock Venture 
Limited 
Gemstone mining 
License 
D-extension-1 0.59   sq. km. J.S. Magezi & Sons Gemstone Mining 
License 
D-extension-2 0.40   sq. km. Paradiso Minerals Limited Gemstone Mining 
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License 
D-extension-3 0.28  sq. km. Gem & Rock Ventures Gemstone Mining 
License 
D-extension-4 0.19  sq. km. Tanzanite Africa Limited Gemstone Mining 
License 
Source: Merelani Controlled Area (J. Nayopa Report: 2006) 
 
SMALL-SCALE DISPLACEMENT PLAN IN FULL SWING: In 2000, before 
production had actually been started, AFGEM started the process of branding their 
Tanzanite under the name “The Tanzanite Foundation.” According to the company, the 
brand name would give a guarantee to the socially-aware consumer of the origin, 
mining methods and export channels of their purchase (AFGEM 2001). Small-scale 
miners and dealers were thus angry to read statements like (I) “The Tanzanite 
Foundation will be the primary authority for Tanzanite globally and central to the 
strategic marketing of branded Tanzanite” and (2) “Only the Tanzanite Foundation can 
offer a Declaration of Practice which accompanies every Tanzanite gem, which assures 
the owner that the stone has made the full journey, from mine to market, with complete 
integrity and strict adherence to political, social and environmental ethics.” 
(advertisement in a gem magazine, 2001). This was typical as regards a skewing of the 
market by giant firms, leading to market failures for weak economies, like Tanzania’s, 
where local investors would be unable to compete and where there would be a form of 
victimization of local dealers (See table 3 for other local investors).    
 
BRANDING: A De-Beers-type strategy, termed vertical integration, was being 
implemented by AFGEM to displace small dealers. Vertical integration has been an 
important strategy via which to meet competition and even displace middlemen in the 
diamond sector used by De-Beers – and AFGEM had now adopted this for the 
Tanzanite sector.
17
 In the report by the Mboma Probe Committee on the causes of the 
Tanzanite crisis, one of the former AFGEM bosses was quoted as saying that the 
branding procedure would enable the company to monopolize and control the price of 
Tanzanite - which was contrary to Fair Competition Act No. 4, of 1994 (which Act 
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forbids any individual, be it a person or a company, from creating a trade monopoly). 
The committee also challenged the emblem being used to control the trade with the 
fact that it was not registered in Tanzania, but in South Africa. AFGEM was making use 
of a “Tanzanite Foundation” brand name, announcing it as the Global Authority on 
Tanzanite. Up to now, AFGEM has continued to intensify its marketing strategy 
pertaining to the gem, which goes hand in hand with this branding strategy. So the 
company is ‘sensitizing’ dealers abroad to trading in its brand, a situation which seeks 
to convince persons to abandon the practice of selling Tanzanite that has been directly 
exported by other dealers, small miners or middlemen. 
18
  
 
SUPPLY CONTROL: Writing for This Day (January 24, 2006), from the USA, 
Rwehabuta Barongo said that the supply of Tanzanite for the exhibition at the Tucson 
Gemstone Show, being organized by the American Gem Trade Association (AGTA), 
was continuing to decline chiefly due to the tactics of Tanzanite One to control supply. 
Tanzanite One had taken over the AFGEM plot and its properties and had selected 
companies called Sight Holders. The Sight Holder’s list is made up of six companies, 
members of the Tanzanite Foundation, which created a separate grading scale for 
Tanzanite and the list provides foundation certificates that are only available to its 
members. Under the strategy, Tanzanite will have the Tanzanite Foundation seal. If the 
stone does not have this emblem, it may be deemed to be fake in the eyes of the 
Tanzanite Foundation, and it is therefore not graded according to industry standards 
and ‘has not followed’ ethical procedures on its way to the market. Thus, Tanzanite 
One and the Tanzanite Foundation are trying to manipulate the market and, in effect, 
are attempting to form a monopoly in the Tanzanite business. Barongo says that 
Tanzanite One, at the exhibition, was trying to de-associate itself from the Foundation, 
however, via specific tactics, in order to gain public support. A De-Beers model – as in 
the diamond industry - is now being approached. Tanzanite One has already selected 
Sight Holders who shy away from selling non-Tanzanite One brands.  
 
CONQUERING DISTRIBUTORS: Sight Holders are selected from the world's 
leading gemstone houses and jewellery manufacturers. They are chosen for their focus 
on Tanzanite, their ability to make a long-term commitment, for distribution capabilities, 
                                            
18 
Tanzanite Foundation: www.tanzanitefoundation.com 
SEBASTIAN PASCHAL SANGA: THE ROLE OF POOR GOVERNANCE IN THE TANZANITE-AL QUAEDA 
LINK CONTROVERSY, AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR TANZANIA ENABLING IT TO ESCAPE FROM ‘CURSES’ IN 
THE MINING INDUSTRY 
 28 
their understanding of the need for vertical integration and operational standards of 
integrity. These six appointed Sight Holders are: Colorjewels (web: www.dyach.com ), 
with offices in New York, Hong Kong, Thailand, Jaipur and Tanzania (Arusha); K. L. 
Tambi & Co. which is a jeweller based in Jaipur, India, who has been in business for 
more than three decades; and Rare Multicolor Gems, with offices stretching from 
Jaipur, India to the USA, Europe, Hong Kong and Bangkok. Also included are the New 
York-based STS Jewels, which is one of the world's largest manufacturers and 
distributors of Tanzanite jewellery; and Tanzanite International, a member of the 
Diamonds International family of stores. The Tanzanite Company (TTC), an 
international supplier of loose and set polished Tanzanite, has also joined the group, 
which company is located in the United Kingdom and South Africa. These firms have 
been inscribed and certified by the Tanzanite Foundation. The Tanzanite Foundation 
certificate assures TTC'S customers and end-consumers alike that its Tanzanite is 
authentic and has been accurately quality-graded and has made the route from the 
mine to market ethically. In so doing, Tanzanite One has replicated De-Beer’s strategy 
to control the market with its products.
19
 Like Tanzanite One, De-Beers has an agent 
Sight Holder, which is a company on the Diamond Trading Company (DTC), and it has 
a list of authorized bulk purchasers of rough diamonds. DTC is controlled by the De-
Beers Group, the single largest producer and purveyor of rough diamonds in the world.  
 
NO SOLUTION FOR SMALL MINERS: TAMIDA complains that the strategy of 
AFGEM, now Tanzanite One, to establish a Tanzanite brand for their company and 
advertise, worldwide, that it is the only producer of 'true Tanzanite' is against the 
national and global policy of trade liberalization (Colored Stone publication May/June 
2003). Unfortunately, the current environment in Tanzania has failed to address this 
problem, and this has created conflicts in the sector. The government appears to have 
been taking it lightly. So weak bargaining and weak regulatory capacities on the part of 
Tanzania has resulted in an abuse of market powers by AFGEM. A lack of political will 
to take stern measures to regulate and create fair and transparent systems in the 
production and marketing of the gemstone is partly to blame - and this has been taken 
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on board in the list of policy interventions this paper suggests. The then Minister for 
Energy and Minerals, Al-Noor Kassum, declared the region a designated area for small 
Tanzanite mining operations under Section 69 of the Mining Act. The section is still in 
force. Residents in the village and small miners, in particular, explain that the Merelani 
area has been legally set aside for small-scale Tanzanite miners since January 1980, 
though the government had not been willing to push this fact.  
 
Yet there are also positive roles that are being played by AFGEM, now Tanzanite 
One. They include job creation, whereby hundreds of local people have been 
employed; the company also pays taxes to the government and funds various 
community development projects as part of its corporate responsibilities - funded 
projects being, for example, a community centre, repairs to and installation of electricity 
supplies for the village, the provision of water, and the construction of buildings for 
primary and secondary schools. 
 
Conflicts between AFGEM/Tanzanite One and small miners are not the only 
problem here, though - so the next section overviews the whole sector, and especially 
looks at how small miners operate and examines their role in smuggling processes.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3.1 A Deeper look at the Tanzanite Industry   
Apart from conflicts arising between AFGEM and small dealers, the Tanzanite 
sector is also poorly organized - from production, to the market structure, to its loose-
exit channels that encourage large-scale plundering. 
3.2 Production  
POORLY-ORGANIZED PRODUCTION: The Tanzanite sector is poorly organized. 
There are over six major companies along with a group of over 600 small miners who 
control plot B. Except for Tanzanite One and a few firms, dealers in other firms 
comprise artisanal miners and jobless people from all parts of the country and from all 
walks of life, some of whom are not Tanzania residents.
20
 Mining operations are 
organized haphazardly, with various classes of people playing different roles in 
Tanzanite mining - there is a plot owner for each plot or pit; and there are people called 
detectors, traditional geologists, who assist the plot owner. The geologist has an 
essential role in detecting Tanzanite-bearing rocks and directs a pit’s route as the 
digging process proceeds below the earth.  
 
SNAKE BOYS: The geologist is assisted by young boys, called “snake boys,” 
whose role is also to penetrate rocks and ‘pave the way’ for others to penetrate or 
advance along tunnels by the side of rock that is rich in Tanzanite. The role of snake 
boys begins immediately after explosives have blown the rocks away. Snake boys also 
slither into pits and tunnels to dig and collect sand, which is extracted from the pits and 
which is then meticulously examined to see whether it contains gemstones or not. 
According to the folk vocabulary of Merelani, geologists, helpers, and snake boys are 
jointly known as "Appolos", Appolos usually being shabby, distraught-looking people. 
Snake boys are in most cases regarded as child labour. For example, a recent film with 
the headline “Gem Slaves: Tanzanite’s Child Labor, September 2006,” which was 
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shown recently via the UN in New York, says that child labour is a major problem at 
Mererani. The film has the message that, although the Tanzanite Industry is worth 
US$300 million a year, the town’s residents live in desperate poverty - with children 
having the heaviest load. Every day, many risk their lives in mine shafts for barely one 
meal a day. Despite efforts to curb this practice, the author says, a global thirst for 
Tanzanite continues to drive these children underground (htt://www.irinnews.org/film). 
There were similar stories from the past. In 2003, Adrian Stuijt, identifying herself as a 
retired medical journalist from South Africa, linked informal mining dealers in Tanzanite 
with child labour.
21
 Under the headline “Blood-Tanzanite gems,” the article blamed 
small miners for using child slaves in their operations at Merelani.  
TAKE AWAY GROUP: There is another group which is popular at Merelani - the 
"take-away boys." While the former group sticks to one plot and works with special plot 
owners to earn their daily bread, “take-aways", are a group of young men who are 
"born free" souls and hence do not wish to work for anybody. They live by gambling, 
from sun-up to sun-down.  The "take-aways" are usually behind the violence that is 
always erupting at the settlement. In 2000, for example, a group of "take-aways" 
attacked a group of Appolos with the intention of stealing their Tanzanite. The same 
year, "take-aways" from among Sonjo tribesmen were engaged in incidents of this 
nature, in which about nine people were killed, and 32 people were injured. Yet the 
‘hooligans’ were later overpowered - at least 570 Sonjos surrendered to the 
settlement's police post. Apart from deaths arising from physical violence, hundreds of 
people die from accidents in the mines. 
A poorly-organized system continues to place small dealers at risk. Over 200 
people have died since 1996 due to various accidents occurring at Merelani: heavy 
rainfalls, falling rocks, suffocation when in a mine… On April 9, 1998, a heavy 
downpour killed about 77 Appolos when pits were flooded with water. For Appolos are 
ready to take risks, as they go as deep as 400 metres underground to look for 
Tanzanite. Of great significance is the fact that there is no ‘formal employment’ in 
relation to the Tanzanite industry, especially when it comes to small miners; a plot 
owner will mobilize the services of Appolos to begin a Tanzanite hunt, who will 
immediately start excavating and tunneling in search of it; and the plot owner provides 
them with food and water during this preliminary work - yet owing to the poor 
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equipment used, it may take several months or a year before any such pit becomes 
productive; while the work is always cumbersome, dangerous and costly. 
SITUATION ANALYSIS: The precious minerals’ sector in Tanzania was largely, 
during the first three decades of independence (as from the earliest days of colonial 
rule), dominated by artisanal miners. These miners carried out mining operations that 
were entirely self-financed, by using simple techniques and tools. Artisanal mining is 
particularly labour-intensive; and it gives employment and incomes to large numbers of 
people who are generally uneducated, poor, itinerant, and who live in remote areas 
where no opportunities exist for formal employment. Artisanal mining is not supported 
by the system - and is viewed with suspicion or outright hostility by the government, the 
international community, the bigger companies, as well as by local financial institutions. 
The latter almost invariably tend to favor large-scale, capital- and resource-intensive 
mining as carried out by powerful and well-connected multinational corporations. There 
have been some promises made by the government to support small miners, however - 
yet it has not managed to live up to such promises. Small miners cannot improve the 
ways they operate; they work in isolation, having no plans to cooperate; while many of 
them fail even to legalize their operations. 
3.3 Markets 
MIDDLEMEN: In Merelani, there is a middle and high-class group of persons – 
“brokers” - who do not engage in the production or digging of gemstones; they are 
interested in buying the gems. In remote mining sites there are the Maasai and Luo, 
who make up over 85 percent of high- and middle-level dealers. Apart from the Maasai 
and Luo, though, there is a small group of middlemen who have no capital, yet who 
provide links between buyers and sellers. J. Nayopa, Zonal Mining Officer, says in his 
report entitled “Merelani, Controlled Area, 2006” that there are over 520 brokers buying 
Tanzanite at the village; thus, it is extremely difficult to register the amount of Tanzanite 
persons mine, sell and take away from the village. Many of the gemstones’ major 
buyers are Kenyans, belonging to the aforementioned two ethnic groups, the Luo and 
the Maasai (who, since colonialists drew the crude boundary lines between Tanzania 
and Kenya, have happily been living on both sides of the border).  
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MARKET LEVELS: Unlike gold, the Tanzanite market is complicated, indeed 
uncontrollable, making the more organized and capital-bearing Kenya (Nairobi) the 
prime market for mineral dealing. There are two to four marketing ‘levels’ in the 
Tanzanite marketing chain, up to the point of export. The first point of sale is at the 
mine, where mineworkers sell their minerals to either the plot holder or a mine broker. 
The second point is in the village, although some plot holders/mine brokers sell to long-
distance brokers, who will then take the minerals to one of the regional export markets. 
The third notable point of sale may be a branch office; and the fourth is actual export to 
a foreign buyer. Participants throughout the chain integrate themselves whenever they 
can. Mine workers, of course, love to sell to a foreign buyer directly - and vice versa - 
though with most sales, time and travel costs make it more economical to go via the 
chain. Reports from the Central Bank of Kenya indicate that re-exports from this 
country make up one of the biggest income-earning activities.
22
 Within Kenyan exports 
for 2004, 25 percent came from re-exports, the largest percentage of re-export-earning 
wealth for the country (with this being followed by tea, at 16 percent). The Kenyan 
government does not disclose information about specific items that are re-exported, 
although, during this study it was identified that minerals smuggled from Tanzania form 
the largest portion of such re-exports.  
3.4 Exports 
SMUGGLING AND JOB CREATION ABROAD: In 2001, a total of 4.57 tons of raw 
Tanzanite was shipped to India, which was about 83 percent of exported Tanzanite in 
total.  Tanzanite processing has created 250,000 jobs in Jaipur, India. In June 2003, 
the Tanzanian government introduced legislation banning the export of unprocessed 
Tanzanite, which move was seen as a serious problem for the city of Jaipur, as one-
third of its annual gem exports come from Tanzanite. In order to make this operative, 
plans were drawn up for Merelani to be a controlled area and made into an Export 
Processing Zone (EPZ) for Tanzanite. Yet the government is now reluctant to 
implement the decision - people with vested interests are trying to discourage the 
move. A mafia-like and syndicated trading arrangement now shrouds the Tanzanite 
industry, therefore - a development which threatens the gemstone’s local market, and 
which places government revenue in jeopardy. 
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A group of master dealers exists, most of whom are foreigners who travel to Arusha 
to buy gemstones; and no license is required, just capital. The dealers meet with 
Tanzanite sellers via the facilitation of registered Arusha and Nairobi offices. 
Interviewed stakeholders say sellers and buyers pay 5 percent of sales proceeds to 
office bearers. In Nairobi, gemstone offices are always congested, and prices are 
always able to be manipulated. It is difficult to see what race dealers are, except via 
their skin color. In spite of their long journeys to Nairobi and their physical toil, at the 
end of the day Tanzanian dealers remain poorer; it is the group of master dealers who 
benefit from the miners’ work. Interviewed dealers say that buyers normally take 75 
percent of any Tanzanite sale price, while local miners are left with 25 percent of the 
transaction. The price of Tanzanite might be 800 US dollars or 1102.50 per carat, in 
the US, but in Tanzania the price is as low as 200 per carat. The Tanzanite industry 
operates in an exploitative manner, therefore - in both Tanzania and Kenya. In Nairobi 
and Arusha, middlemen are united, which is why they are in a good position to play cat-
and-mouse games with small miners. The actual connection with miners is not clear, 
but there are miners, working for companies or as individuals, as middlemen, whose 
interest is just to sell Tanzanite within Tanzania and via a group of exporters. TAMIDA 
admits that their members’ decision to offer space to illegal dealers from abroad is 
unethical. The industry thus allows for the presence of unscrupulous brokers who can 
undermine the value of Tanzanite; they prefer to purchase raw Tanzanite, and tend to 
discourage any local processing of the stone.
23
  
3.5 Looting and routing 
LOOTING: Official statistics indicate that, in 2000, Tanzania registered exports of 
Tanzanite amounting to only US$12 million – although the actual value of the 
gemstone reaching the world market was over US$150 million. More than US$138 
million worth of Tanzanite crossed borders unnoticed that year, therefore. The United 
States Ministry of Commerce the same year stated that it spent about US$328 million 
on Tanzanite purchases, though statistics on exported Tanzanite from Tanzania 
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begged to differ. The US retail market for Tanzanite and Tanzanite jewellery is reported 
to be worth around US$ 500 million a year24- yet Tanzania captures only a fraction of 
this, merely US$16 million. Other studies indicate that Tanzanite sales in the United 
States alone are said to be worth more than US$400 million a year, which means 
nobody knows exactly how much Tanzanite is being smuggled out or sold in other 
ways. It is not easy to establish the actual rate of looting, however, as the US is not the 
only importer of the gemstone, for it goes to India and several other locations.  
 
There was growing pressure in late 1999 for the government to take action against 
Indian gem traders who were purchasing gemstones directly from mineral brokers and 
miners via subleased offices in Arusha. It is believed that most of their minerals were 
either smuggled out of the country - or were considerably undervalued. Official 
gemstone exports going directly from Tanzania to India were valued at less than US$4 
million in 1998 (Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 1999).  In the same year, exports of 
cut Tanzanite Jaipur, India were valued at US $27.53 million (Government of India, 
1999). The gap here stems partly from the fact that Jaipur gets most of its supply 
through Nairobi, and partly from the greater values that are added via cutting. Gem 
industry reports in India show that about one third of gem-cutters in Jaipur now work 
only with Tanzanite. Much gem cutting in Jaipur is done in tiny, family-run workshops, 
using simple tools - which contrasts with the other major gem centers of Asia, such as 
Bangkok and Hong Kong, where a major investment is required to be able to operate a 
modern lapidary.
25
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CHAPTER 4 
4.1 Past Attempts to Do Away With the Curse  
Different agendas have been drawn up and discussed at different levels in an 
attempt to get rid of the “curse” in the Tanzanite industry - yet most were only either 
partially implemented or not at all; they have included research to establish causes of 
the “curse”, where recommendations relating to fiscal and tax administration etc. were 
made. Other ideas were to have Tanzanite’s Advisory Board and Probe Committees 
look into the situation, to establish an EPZ for Tanzanite so as to stop exports of the 
raw gem, or to get endorsement of the Tanzanite protocol to restore confidence in the 
Tanzanite trade. Such moves are examined in more detail below. 
4.2 Tax Reform Initiatives  
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded one 
study, whose draft was published in October 1999. The Economic and Social Research 
Foundation (ESRF), International Business Initiatives (IBI) and Harvard Institute for 
International Development collaborated to carry out the research - and they 
recommended that fiscal measures are applied. The study came up with several fiscal 
alternative regimes by which dealers would be able to comply with tax requirements; 
also, they came up with a set of policies which they said would reduce incentives to 
smuggle minerals and which would enhance tax compliance. Proposals were ways of 
reducing the multiplicity of taxes/fees/charges and the elimination of bureaucracy in the 
tax administration system. The recommendations appear to be pending.  
4.3 Formation of an Advisory Board and Probe Committees  
The government also formed an advisory board and put together more than two 
probe committees. With the forming of an advisory body - the Tanzanite Board, 
comprising government and non-government stakeholders in the industry – there was a 
mandate to oversee the mining, trade and exporting of Tanzanite, to promote a form of 
value-adding for Tanzanite within Tanzania, and to develop a Tanzanite certification 
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system (like that pertaining to the Kimberley Process). While between 2000 and 2003 
three committees were formed to look into things and put forward options to address 
the problem. These bodies were chaired by different chairpersons - Godfrey 
Mang’enya, Mr. Muhogo and Robert Mboma. Mboma’s committee was formed 
immediately after the Tanzanite-Al Qaeda controversy erupted, and its activities were 
to establish the causes of the crisis in the sector and to recommend options.  
 
Regarding the battles over plots – e.g. plot C (belonging to AFGEM) and B (small 
miners) - the committees said that part of Block B had been taken away and added to 
AFGEM’s plot C. Efforts by the committee to gain access to files and area maps were 
unsuccessful after the Ministry of Energy and Minerals refused to make information 
available (explaining that the files had been lost). According to the probe team, indeed, 
over 100 files are apparently ‘missing’ at the Ministry of Energy and Minerals - which 
thus makes it difficult to obtain data that indicates plot borders at Merelani. 
 
In the committee reports, options to end the conflicts were put forward. They 
included suggestions that foreign investors, and AFGEM in particular, should terminate 
their involvement in gemstones, and only local dealers would be allowed to engage in 
gemstone mining. They also suggested that AFGEM should stop branding the 
gemstone, for this went against fair competition rules. They also raised queries over 
the transfer of Graphtan’s shares to MML/AFGEM, the registration of AFGEM 
Tanzania, MML and the Tanzanite Foundation. Not only did the proposed measures fail 
to be implemented, however - the probe team reports were not communicated to the 
general public by the last government. 
4.4 EPZ Initiatives  
On February 2, 2002 the government’s cabinet approved a plan to establish Export 
Processing Zones (EPZ) in selected parts of Tanzania. In the EPZ special initiatives 
and privileges would be given to investors. The approved plan anticipated the inclusion 
of the Tanzanite industry in the EPZ scheme, as a priority; and there was a strategy to 
make sure that all dealers sold processed Tanzanite and that gemstone-selling shows 
would be held in Arusha, northern Tanzania - instead of, as in the current system, 
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outside the country (in South Africa or the USA, chiefly). Neither the EPZ nor the local 
exhibition ideas have become operative, however.   
     
4.5 The Tucson-Tanzanite Protocol 
Immediately after the United States stopped selling Tanzanite following the Al 
Qaeda link controversy, Tanzania’s government initiated measures to clear the 
allegations. The Tanzanite Summit (involving the governments of Tanzania and the 
United States, along with other dealers in the industry) was held on February 8, 2002 in 
Tucson, Arizona, in the US. 
26
 The so-called Tucson Tanzanite Protocol to restore 
confidence in Tanzanite was endorsed with a list of measures to be deployed by 
Tanzania. The measures were for Tanzania to safeguard Tanzanite by licensing those 
who mined it at source and those who traded within Tanzania, and to make what is 
currently the sole Tanzanite deposit a controlled access area in order to ensure the 
integrity of legitimate sources of Tanzanite, to thus gain the economic benefits of 
internal trade.  Additionally, all countries and persons involved in the trade, via a shared 
approach, were urged to improve transparency and accountability in the supply chain, 
thereby providing the greatest possible amount of protection of a legitimate stream of 
commerce. 
 
Specific tasks to be executed by Tanzania and other stakeholders were as follows: 
• To come-up with a detailed 'market chain analysis’ in relation to Tanzanite so as 
to determine what improvements might need to be made to prevent possible 
abuses in the manner in which the product is brought to market.    
• To encourage cooperation among governments/industry and to strengthen and 
maintain a system of oversight, control and law enforcement relating to the 
movement of Tanzanite from mines to the point of first export, in order to protect 
trade legitimacy. 
• To create a system of warranties, in cooperation with the government of 
Tanzania, in writing, for use by first exporters and all those ‘downstream’ in the 
business chain - which would state that Tanzanite bought, sold, cut, polished, set 
or otherwise traded has come from legitimate sources.   
                                            
26
 See: The Tucson Tanzanite Protocols 2002. 
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• To implement the Tanzanian government’s new plan to establish Export 
Processing EPZs, anticipating the inclusion of the Tanzanite industry in the 
scheme, as a priority. 
• To ensure that subsequent traders only accept, after the first export, Tanzanite 
that is accompanied by the appropriate written warranties. 
• To make sure that sellers of Tanzanite or jewelry containing Tanzanite get the 
appropriate written warranty from their supplier.   
 
These measures have not been implemented by Tanzania’s government as yet. But 
Tanzanite One anticipated events, so began promoting its own ‘ethical’ mining practice. 
To this end, the company launched a multi-million program to promote Tanzanite in 
foreign markets – though this, as seen above, has been seen as a way of monopolizing 
the market and crowding out smaller production outfits. Indeed, experts do feel that 
Tanzanite One may endeavour to ‘criminalize’ Tanzanite products emanating from 
other dealers. Yet the government, which should have implemented the Tucson 
Protocol, has opted to keep quiet… And there could be several reasons for this silence, 
including a lack of political will and (secret) vested interests by politicians, 
shareholders, traders and from other countries. It also indicates the degree of poor 
governance and sector corruption, for it is not just the Tucson protocol that has stalled, 
but also other committee recommendations. Activists say the reasons are many, 
perhaps that ‘probe teams’ were really formed just to fool the public. There are lots of 
people with vested interests in this industry; for example, among the countries involved, 
Kenya and India are the largest beneficiaries, though they were not featured in the 
meeting to endorse the Tucson Tanzanite Protocol; then there is South Africa, the 
United Kingdom, other European countries, Asia and Australia – and the number of 
countries with specific interests has now recently increased after the AFGEM sale.  
 
We will now take taking a look at the mining industry as a whole (see next section).   
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 CHAPTER 5 
5.1 A Low Level of Contributions to the Economy in Spite of the Increased 
Investment  
The role of minerals in Tanzania’s economy has dwindled notably compared to in 
the 1950s. The contribution of mining to GDP was reportedly as high as 10 percent in 
this decade and, together with agriculture, provided the bulk of government tax and 
foreign exchange earnings. The coming of independence brought with it political and 
economic uncertainty, though, for the large foreign investor community; and such 
uncertainty, coupled with the continuing low gold price of US$35 dollars per ounce, led 
to the closure of most mines in the country. In the mid-1960s a command economy 
was established and caused the further withdrawal of foreign investors from mining in 
Tanzania. As a result, the contribution of the mining sector to GDP fell to less than 1 
percent. During this phase (in the 1970s and 1980s) the mining industry stagnated due 
to a lack of investment capital, technology and management, so that the mining 
sector’s presence was no longer felt in the economy.
27
  
This situation has, of course, now been changed. The major policy, fiscal and 
regulatory landmarks that have attracted more mining firms to Tanzania are the Mineral 
Sector Policy of 1997, which has set specific objectives and challenges aiming at 
revamping the mining industry, the enactment of the Financial Laws Miscellaneous 
Amendments Act 1997 (providing for an improved fiscal package for the Mining sector) 
and the Mining Act of 1998, which addresses the most important issues of concern to 
the mining investor community; and then there is the Value Added Tax Act of 1997, 
designed to provide special relief for registered mining activities.  
 
Reform ‘results’ are that there is now an increased number of prospecting licenses - 
to over 2,000, from around 10 in 1990! From 1998 to 2006, at least six new, modern, 
large-scale gold mines and a Tanzanite One mine have been invested in, which is a 
record for the mining sector. A number of multinational companies - such as Resolute 
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 Tanzania Chamber of Minerals and Energy: Newsletter 2006.  
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Mining Limited, AnglogoldAshanti, the Barrick Gold Corporation, Falconbridge, 
Tanzanite One, Gallery Gold, a revamped Williamson Diamonds, Goldstream and 
others - are exploring and developing mines throughout the country. The gold mines - 
the Golden Pride Mine in Nzega, owned by Resolute (T) Limited; the Geita Gold Mine, 
owned by AnglogoldAshanti; the Bulyanhulu gold mine in Kahama; the Tulawaka mine 
in Biharamulo, north Mara; that of the Barrick Gold Corporation; and the Buhemba 
Gold Mine - currently in operation have a combined annual production capacity of 1.75 
million ounces of gold, worth over US$700 million. Total investment in these gold, 
Tanzanite and diamond mining projects has amounted to around US$1.3 billion. The 
value of total mineral exports from the new ventures in the year 2005 was US$692.8 
million - compared to US$16.1 million in 1997, with gold alone going up from US$13.1 
million in 1999 to US$639.2 million in 2005. In 2005, Tanzania was said to be Africa’s 
third largest gold producer, behind South Africa and Ghana. Unfortunately this increase 
does not reflect much in terms of GDP and social-economic indicators.  
5.2 Economic Indicators 
The paradox here is that in spite of the fact that mining is the fastest growing sector 
it represents approximately 3.2 percent of the country’s GDP. The sector grew by 15.7 
percent in 2005 - compared with 15.4 percent in 2004, thereby contributing 3.5 percent 
and 3.2 percent to the GDP respectively. Despite its recent growth, though, its effects 
in reducing the country’s ‘poverty’ have been minimal. Reports by researchers suggest 
that mining could have been ‘a savior’ for Tanzania. An “Assessment of the mining 
sector: the Perspective of Tanzania” by Professor Raphael Mwalyosi confirms that, for 
Tanzania, the contribution of the sector to the economy is clearly at a minimum.  
 
Table 4A:  Contribution of the Mining Sector as a Percentage of GDP (1990 as base 
year) 
Year GDP % 
1988 0.8 
1989 1.8 
1990 0.9 
1991 1 
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1992 1.12 
1993 1.12 
1994 1.3 
1995 1.38 
1996 1.5 
1997 1.7 
1998 1.9 
1999 2 
2000 2.4 
2001 2.5 
2002 2.8 
2003 2.89 
2004 3.12 
2005 3.36 
Source: Compiled by the researcher  
 
 
Table 4B: Mineral Production Composition, by Major Types  
Gold  90.68 
Silver 0.33 
Copper 1.49 
Diamonds 6.40 
Tanzanite 1.10 
Total 100 
 Source: For tables 4A & B, the Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar Es Salaam 
 
Table 4C: Exports of Tanzanite 2000-2006 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Volume 
in grams  
5.5m  5.4m 6.4m 4.5m 3.9m 1.3m 3.4m 
Value in 
$million 
16.2 15.9 17.3 13.1 24.2 34 43.6 
Source: Daily News May 10, 2007  
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Many social indicators in Tanzania are comparable with or are better than those of 
countries having the same income levels. There are indications of there being a high 
degree of deprivation with regard to health standards, food security and education 
attainment. Infant and under-five mortality rates are, respectively, 86 and 133 per 1000; 
while life expectancy is around 49. Malnutrition affects 44 percent of children - and 
access to safe water stands at around 50 percent.  
 
There is another argument involved here, too: that Tanzania has numerous 
resources, and it does not know which should be prioritized... The Country’s Strategy 
Paper (CSP), the working document emanating from Tanzania-European Union (EU) 
cooperation, does not refer to minerals as being a priority resource that can be used for 
the Tanzania’s poverty eradication program – so it seems that this sector does not 
connect up with the rest of the economy, so there is no major multiplier effect here. Up 
until now, revenue from mining in Tanzania has not been earmarked for any specific 
purposes, e.g. the construction of roads (as in the case of other countries, like 
Botswana). In Tanzania, around 95 percent of the national fund used to construct new 
roads comes from donors, while the remaining 5 percent is provided by the 
government. The total amount of bilateral/multilateral aid to Tanzania in 2003 
(US$1699 million) was 47 times higher than what the government earned in mining 
revenue (OECD 2005:231). Persons do argue that mining companies’ investment in 
infrastructure is simply for their own benefit – e.g. they repair roads leading to mines 
only. Economic connections between mining and the rest of the economy, including via 
the government budget, are thus limited; and tax/royalty incentives have so far resulted 
in limited tax revenues - although it is true that increased export earnings have been 
generated. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6.1 An Evidence-based scenario relating to poor governance 
There are several examples of cases in which one can see poor governance at 
work in the mining sector.  
 
Smuggling with Impunity  
In 1991, for example, about US$36,000 worth of gold was seized at Dar es Salaam 
International Airport (DIA). The case was handled by the then Minister of Home Affairs, 
Augustino Lyatonga Mrema, who is now the Chairman of the opposition, Tanzania 
Labour Party (TLP). He arrested the culprits and announced publicly that the gold’s 
owners were ‘big shots’ in the government. No sooner had he finished announcing this 
than an order came from above, directing him to release the culprits, unconditionally 
and with immediate effect. When people asked him who these ‘big shots’ were, Mrema 
said his boss had the answer... The then President Ally Hassan Mwinyi explained that 
the concerned persons involved in the scandal were not necessarily ministers, meaning 
that they could have been other criminal types – though he didn’t say who they were. It 
was established later that persons in the government were at logger-heads with each 
other after this arrest, which situation had forced Mrema to release the culprits. 
 
Tanzania has well-organized forms of mineral smuggling, involving companies, 
traders and/or government officials, who undertake such activities with seeming 
impunity it would seem. Precise data on the amount of minerals being smuggled is 
difficult to establish, but the Ministry of Energy and Minerals was quoted as saying in 
the 1990s that gold worth over US$50,000 was being smuggled out on a daily basis 
from Tanzania, equivalent to about US$18 billion a year. 
 
Below is a list of more examples of poor governance. 
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Mysterious Projects 
CASE No I - PRESIDENT LAUNCHES QUESTIONABLE PROJECT: The drive to 
get some addition of value in relation to minerals saw former President Benjamin 
Mkapa inaugurate the Mwananchi Gold Company Ltd, a multibillion-shilling investment. 
The project was expected to begin processing gold in 2005. Shareholders are the Bank 
of Tanzania, which owns 20 percent, the National Development Corporation (NDC), 
with 15 percent, the Mwananchi Trust Company, with 45 percent (owned by the ruling 
party CCM), and an Italian investor having 20 percent. However, two issues have been 
questioned regarding this project: the involvement of the Bank of Tanzania, and the 
mysterious CCM Trust Company Limited (where members, including guarantors, were 
not aware of the deal). The BoT, which has been financing the project, lacks a 
regulatory mandate; and Members of Parliament handling government ventures were 
not consulted about anything. Efforts by MPs to query the legality of the BoT’s and 
CCM’s involvement in the project did not produce tangible results. Nazir Karamagi, the 
Minister for Industry, Trade and Marketing during 2006/2007 Parliamentary sessions 
defended the government - he said it was not the business of parliament to know who 
actually owns the company. The question was: why did the President - who was also 
chairman of the ruling CCM - decide to launch a mysterious project in the name of the 
party, where MPs and CCM guarantors did not know about it?  
 
CASE No II - GOVERNOR HEADS QUESTIONABLE PROJECT: This concerns 
the Buhemba Gold Mining (BGM), located in the Mara region of northern Tanzania. 
This is another mysterious project, one instigated in 2002. Ownership of the project has 
always remained confidential. The Member of Parliament for the constituency, Nimrod 
Mkono, has been pressing the government to make known the project’s ownership 
structure, but in vain. Now, the company has wound-up its operations.
28
 The Governor 
of the Bank of Tanzania, David Balali, was on the company’s Board of Trustees. 
Initially, the mine was under the joint ownership of the National Defence Force (JWT) 
and a company from South Africa, on which the government has not been able to 
provide adequate information. The joint company had been named Meremeta; and it 
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 Tanzania Daima publication, December 4, 2006; and This Day of August 16, 2006. 
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was set up to finance military procurement outside the scope of the budget, though 
collapsed - leaving the ministry with a US$130m debt.
29
  
 
CASE No III - STATE FIRM DOES NOT HAVE LEGALITY: Tansort, a London-
based Tanzania Diamond Sorting Office and Marketing Centre, which is jointly run by 
the Tanzania government and De-Beers of South Africa, is said to be involved in a 
mysterious project, too. Tansort’s sales have never been remitted to Tanzania’s 
Treasury since it was set up in 1966. The Parliamentary Standing Committee has 
recently established that Tansort, as an entity, has no legal basis in law at worst - or 
stands on a shaky legal foundation at best. The centre was set up (by De-Beers and 
the government) to sort, cut and market diamonds produced by Mwadui-based 
Williamson Diamond Limited, in which the Tanzania government has a 25 stake and 
where 75 percent is owned by De-Beers. In July 2006, the Ministry of Energy and 
Minerals investigated the issue, yet came up with no answers – but it did refer to 
another story related to the new diamond business venture. This was about a plan by 
the Williamson Diamond Company Limited (WDC) to construct a new processing plant 
at Mwadui, which, it was claimed, would ‘quadruple earnings’ for Tanzania (Business 
Times March 10-16/2006, July 14-20, 2006). The Parliamentary Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) had auditing queries about Tansort’s financial reports and figures - 
Tshs25, 339, 813, 796 and US$1, 321, 884.94 (raised in previous years) and Tshs10, 
260, 754, 860 and US$379, 983.55 during 2002. The queries actually related to 
diamond sorting fees and the gathering of royalties. The committee also found that 
US$2.5 billion, accruing from the sorting of diamonds, had not been remitted to the 
Treasury – though this amount had been deposited in the account of the Diamond 
Trading Company (DTC), a subsidiary of De-Beers. It was then realized that the 
company had not shown any profits ever, so the government had not received any 
dividends or corporate taxes for decades. In addition, the committee found that Tansort 
(as said) does not, in fact, legally exist. The government has failed to explain how it 
was created. Both Williamson Diamonds and DTC have refused to surrender 
documents to the committee.
30
 The Ministry of Energy and Minerals has admitted that 
Tansort is indeed a mysterious project, even though the government had stakes in it. 
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 Brian Cooksey: Policy exchange paper www.policyexchange.org.uk. 
30 The Guardian, 2004/08/07; and Ministry Budget Speech, Financial year 2004/2005 
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The committee set up to look into the project was formed from within the then sitting 
PAC, in 2003 (This Day, Feb 22, 2007), to look into country’s diamonds trade; and the 
report was drafted a year later. The report was tabled in the August House of August 
2004. Yet for reasons that remain obscure, it was never discussed by other legislators - 
and ended-up being shelved. One major concern is about the sale of government 
shares in WDC. The government had a 50 percent stake in the project, but sold 25 
percent of them to De-Beers without keeping to the proper channels. The sale was 
endorsed on October 19, 2004, two months after a report by the PAC Committee ‘went 
missing’. The worst part of this affair is that shares were sold at ‘peanut prices’. Media 
reports say that it was sold for only US$180,452. Unfortunately, the Presidentially-
formed Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) had failed to produce receipts 
on the sale, leading to allegations that millions of dollars could have been pocketed by 
certain persons at the Executive level of the then third-phase government of President 
Benjamin William Mkapa.    
 
Exports of Mineral-Rich Black Soil 
Exports of black soil to Japan, purportedly for scrutiny abroad - to determine 
whether it contained particles of gold - raises more questions than answers. 
Companies have for several years been shipping black soil from Tanzania to Japan, 
yet do not give proper feedback relating to their activities. So people doubt the rationale 
of the exercise, as it appears to be more costly to ship containers of such soil to Japan 
than to make machines available in the country to detect the mineral contents of the 
said soil on the spot. However, nobody seems to be concerned with such vague 
arrangements, save for a few activists who vainly try to alert the authorities to the 
national losses involved. This could thus appear to be an ‘advanced form’ of 
smuggling. 
  
Dubious Contracts 
The mining sector in Tanzania has recently come under intense scrutiny, and there 
are signs that government officials are beginning to yield to public pressure to take a 
fresh look at mining contracts. The new government, which came to office in December 
2005, has publicly acknowledged that major mining companies have been ‘fiddling’ 
figures to avoid paying the required duties and royalties. The Deputy Minister for 
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Energy and Minerals, Lawrence Masha, disclosed in Parliament that a recent audit 
report by government-appointed assayers had noted that reports presented by large-
scale gold mining firms on their operations were not accurate. Masha said that 
investigations by the assayers were still going on. MPS pressed the government for 
more action on mining contracts, with legislators demanding better profit-sharing 
arrangements and better accountability for the communities where the mines are 
located. Contracts were not known about by people - nor to Parliament. The Tanzanian 
government has “tax stability” agreements with investors, under which the government 
will not upwardly revise taxes or royalties payable to it during mining operations and the 
‘project’s full life’. Alex Stewart, a US company, has been contracted to audit the mining 
companies – and the company is paid 64 percent of what the government gets in 
royalties from minerals. TENSES OK? The payment is huge, therefore – so takes away 
even the tiniest revenues that are generated. Media reports have recently said that one 
of the bosses of this company is a son of the former Minister of Finance, Basil Mramba 
(the person who handled the contract and granted tax relief to this company), though 
he has denied allegations of corruption. 
  
Human Rights Violations, Corruption and Abuses of Power 
THE CASE OF THE VILLAGE OF KAKOLA: In 1996, the government made a 
decision to remove people from the village of Kakola, in the Kahama District, to allow 
the Kahama Mining Corporation Limited (KMCL) to enter the area. Villagers were 
served injunctions to leave their settlement, yet they demanded compensation first and 
sought a court injunction in the Tabora High Court. They won. Despite the court order, 
though, the government sent in policemen, on July 31, 1996, to evict them by force. 
Over 4,000 people were evicted – and were left homeless; while others were alleged to 
have been killed. The case for compensation has been going on in Dar es Salaam, and 
one of the defendants, Maalimu Kadau, said in an interview during this study that 
prolonged rulings in the case had drained away their money, and that others had died 
without being paid a thing. 
 
THE CASE OF THE VILLAGE OF MTAKUJA: Apart from human rights violations, 
there have also been notable incidences of fraud in connection with compensation too. 
With the re-opening of the Geita Gold Mine in 1996, the village of Mtakuja had to be 
relocated. The company claims to have paid out compensation money, though it was 
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the government and the District Council who had to effect payments. It turned out that 
at least 857 entitled people never got any money (Allafrica.com 2001, Knight 2001). 
Instead of making payments to genuine persons, the list contained fake names; and 
some people were said have been fooled into signing for money that they had never 
received. (An elderly man was supposed to have been given Tshs 20,000,000 (US$18 
348). The payments government officer had the money ready in Tshs 500 notes; and 
when the old man spent a long time counting the money at the counter, they told him 
that he was wasting their time and ordered him to sign and then move on; he did so, 
and later realized that he had been paid only 5,000,000 - so he had lost Tshs 
15,000,000.) The Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) investigated the case in 
2002. Two Geita Gold Mine (GGM) employees and a number of civil servants were 
found guilty. In February 2004, it was decided that the government should give Tshs 
600 million (US$550458) to those who had not been properly compensated.
31
  
 
Corruption and the harassment of villagers are also involved here. The PCB has 
been tailing at least five top leaders, both past and present, on allegations they were 
getting payments from a gold mine that has since sold its operations to another gold 
conglomerate. The gold mine is said to have routinely ‘dished out’ monthly allowances 
to public leaders - including a former regional commissioner, a regional and a district 
police commander and the current district commissioner of the region (This Day, 
February 28, 2006). Such officials are alleged to have been on the payroll of the gold 
mine and were given monthly cash handouts of at least Tshs 1,000,000 each; while 
government leaders were receiving routine payments from the gold mine to facilitate 
operations such as the illegal eviction of villagers from their homes without 
compensation (as required by law). Given that mining activities may well need to move 
local communities from their lands, many MPs have demanded that compensation 
should include express provisions for actual resettlement costs. Such demands, 
although accepted by the government as being reasonable, were, however, not 
included in the final Bill which went into law. Human rights abuses are thus rampant in 
this regard, too.  
 
                                            
31
 See Chr. Michelsen Institute or at www.cmi.no/publications. 
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THE BULYANHULU SAGA: In August 1996, Tanzanian authorities evicted a 
community of small-scale miners from their homes and worksites at the Bulyanhulu 
gold fields to allow a Canadian mining company, Sutton Resources, take them over. 
Since then, there have been persistent allegations that as many as 52 people had 
been buried alive when the company filled in small-scale mining shafts; and that the 
evictions were brutal and swift, violating economic and social rights, and they caused 
enormous economic and social hardship. No compensation was paid to people – the 
estimated 30,000 to 400,000 persons who were moved from the area. The mine was 
taken over by the Canadian-owned Barrick Gold Corporation three years later. 
Observers, including Amnesty International, have been calling for an independent 
inquiry into the events of August 1996, though these calls have gone unheeded, and 
there has never been any comprehensive, independent investigation into the 
allegations.
32
 
 
The TML Daily, Internet edition, a daily online newspaper from the Community Party 
of Canada (No III of June 11, 2002), says that in Kahama, Tanzania, in 1997, an 
estimated 50 small miners were buried alive by bulldozers, ones operated by Sutton 
Resources of Canada (now owned by Barrick Gold) and the state mining company, 
backed by paramilitary forces (an event that was chronicled in Amnesty International’s 
annual report of that year).
33
 Ten miners were also said to have been killed by the 
police on the surface of the mine site during the eviction. The United States House of 
Representatives on August 23, 2001 wrote a letter to the World Bank Group, MIGA, in 
particular warning it against giving finances to the Barrick Gold Corporation or its 
subsidiary, Kahama Mining Corporation Limited (KMCL) for Tanzania’s Bulyanhulu 
Gold Mine. MIGA had guaranteed the project in August 2000. A Member of Congress, 
Cynthia McKinney, says in a letter (copied for Barrick) that evidence indeed suggests 
that KMCL employees and Tanzania’s police were involved in major human rights 
abuses in the course of evicting miners. An ad hoc group of North American and 
European non-governmental organizations - which had followed the Bulyanhulu story 
closely - decided to send a small team to Tanzania. The international fact-finding 
mission to Bulyanhulu, of March 23 to 31, 2002, came to the unanimous conclusion 
                                            
32
 http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/institutions/bulyanhulu.html 
33
 htt://www.cpcml.ca/tmld.2002. 
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that an independent, impartial, transparent and comprehensive inquiry into the 
allegations of uncompensated mass evictions of miners and mine owners, and also the 
killing of miners at Bulyanhulu during the summer of 1996, is warranted, desirable and 
urgent. Despite this, however, the government has not made any steps forward.  
 
Mine Brokers 
The 1998 Mining Act makes it far easier for foreign investors to gain access to and 
take control of Tanzania’s mineral resources. Under this Act, for example, holders of 
mineral rights are entitled to exclusive rights of ownership of mining operations and 
uncovered minerals and to have the power to dispose of said minerals. In addition, the 
Act gives investors, both local and foreign, the right to assign, or otherwise transfer, 
mineral rights or a portion of them to other persons. Using this ‘loophole’, some 
companies have become brokers - and they reap millions out of just evicting villagers 
and selling their plots, without compensating anyone. A case in point here is Tanzania 
Royalty Exploration (TRE). TRE has been in Tanzania since 1989, and in April 2001 it 
acquired shares in Tanzania American International Development Corporation Limited 
(Tanzam). Tanzam had 51 licences to look for minerals in the Lake Zone. The 
Tulawaka mine used to be one of their projects in Tanzania. The company is one of the 
largest individual license holders in Tanzania, having 140 mineral licenses covering 
more than 11,570 square kilometers in and around the Lake Victoria Greenstone Belt. 
34
  
 
NOTABLE LOSSES DUE TO BROKERS: Figures suggest that the Tanzanian 
economy lost US$782.12 million, net, in these six years as a result of policy and legal 
reforms under which foreign mining interests gained control of mineral resources. The 
loss might indeed be a much higher if figures relating to the over $1 billion of export 
earnings from between 1998 and 2002, as provided by Tan Discovery, are proved to 
be correct. Evidence indicates that mining ‘investors’ have made hundreds of millions 
of dollars out of precious minerals, even when they have not made any meaningful 
investments in developing mineral deposits - they have done this merely by exercising 
their rights under both the 1979 Act and the 1998 Act, respectively, via which one can 
                                            
34 
Visit the Tan Range website: www.tanrange.com. 
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assign or transfer mineral rights to other foreign investors. A study by LEAT says that 
Samax Gold Inc. of Vancouver, Canada – whose Tanzanian subsidiary, Samax 
Resources, did not pay a penny in compensation to thousands of local small-scale 
miners who were violently ejected from the Lusu gold deposits in the Nzega District in 
September 1996 - later sold their Lusu deposits to Ashanti Goldfields for US$213 
million, in a deal struck on September 1, 1998. Ashanti Goldfields sold the area for an 
unspecified sum of money to Australia’s Resolute Mining Ltd – and the latter spent 
US$45 million building the Golden Pride Mine (Industry magazine). 
            
Environmental Impact Assessment 
This is ignored in most cases. An Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) is one 
issue that needs to be dealt with in relation to any resource “curse”. In a study on the 
performance of EIA in Tanzania, Mwalyosi and Hughes (1998) found a series of 
weaknesses. Although EIA is sometimes perceived to impede development, there is 
need for Tanzanians to adopt EIA in a national context. The study indicated that EIA 
had been initiated too late in the project cycle to be able to influence project design, so 
that there could be no integration between the two, i.e. a project and the EIA. 
Compliance issues are often unclear - and the quality of EIA is often not of a good 
standard. 
6.2 The Problem Summarized        
Talking about the resource curse in its wider perspective, the problem for Tanzania 
is more complicated than external partners might expect. Causes can be summed up in 
three areas: 
• In first place, it is international actors (investors and donors) who have come 
across the internally corrupt system and the weak institutional set-up; also, there 
is a weak civil society, weak opposition parties (partly due to constitutional flaws), 
a controlled media and pathetic regulatory and administrative systems.  
• Secondly, there is no means of establishing integrity, which does away with 
transparency when managing resources and decision-making processes; and 
there is a resistance by executives and minority elites to reforming the system.  
• Finally, there is the question of political patronage, which hinders the 
democratization process not only when it comes to managing resources but also 
when one seeks to carry out political reforms that could then accommodate a 
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much-needed multi-party system. It prevents any democratic transformation or 
real political reform, including within the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) 
itself.   
 
By taking advantage of political stability, some dishonest persons ‘at the top’ still 
reap financial rewards in the form of exemptions and other ‘deals’. The worst part of 
this is that the country’s executive is powerful, so can control MPs (i.e. who may 
otherwise wish to challenge executive orders); so ministers are not accountable to 
MPs. Major reforms are thus resisted… The plunder of local resources in the name of 
investment promotion, incentives provision, competitiveness compliance and/or global 
economic governance is greatly distorted and misused, therefore.  
 
Having now been accepted by external partners, including the home countries of 
giant mining companies, Tanzania is now greatly favored in terms of Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA). ODA - as is the case with debt relief - is used as pain-
killer, and it helps do away with political instability by making it easy for the 
multinationals to grab resources in collaboration with local tycoons. Instead of paying 
due taxes, mining companies make petty contributions in the name of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR).  
 
The fourth-phase government under President Jakaya Kikwete had initially (in 2005) 
declared its commitment to reviewing mining contracts and tax rates, but this 
commitment has now disappeared. Recent statements by his subordinates, including 
the Energy and Minerals minister and the Commissioner, indicate that the chances of 
raising mining royalties are slim. In addition, the anti-resource curse crusade seems is 
have become politicized and, also, dramatized.          
   
In the following, more details are given about the policy and regulatory weaknesses 
which have led to poor governance in the mining industry. To start with, lists three 
areas requiring immediate changes have been noted.     
 
 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 55 
CHAPTER 7 
7.1 Attending to the Resource Curse in Tanzania   
For the purpose of designing a set of policy options to deal with the resource curse 
in Tanzania and to address corruption, there are three proposed policy interventions: 
• A need for Review Policies and Regulations (RPR), which affect the Tanzanite 
industry, the mining sector and investments in general. 
• A need to Adopt Protocols and Internationally Acceptable Standards (APIAS) that 
will help to handle/monitor Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the most equitable 
and effective way.  
• A need to build an effective National Governance and Integrity System (NGIS) 
7.2 A Need to Review Investment Policies and Regulations  
Alternative measures to reverse the resource curse might include amending specific 
regulations and policy governing the mining sector. They would include the Tanzania 
Investment Act, 1997, Financial Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1997, and 
The Mining Act, 1998 – which three the Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team call the 
‘unholy trinity’. Of course, the Mining Policy of 1998 should also be subject to scrutiny.  
 
Overhaul of the Operating Environment 
The first new piece of legislation was the Tanzania Investment Act, 1997. The Act 
was enacted in order “to provide for more favorable conditions for investors,” and it was 
done with extraordinary generosity. Investors are, for example, given very generous 
‘incentives’, which are defined by the Act as “tax relief and concessional tax rates which 
may be accessed by an investor under the Income Tax Act, 1973, the Customs Tariff 
Act, 1976 and the Sales Tax Act, 1976 or any other law for the time being in force.” 
The said tax relief and concessional tax rates “shall not be amended or modified to the 
detriment of the investors enjoying those benefits”. In other words, the government 
cannot, under any circumstances, raise any taxes, royalties or charges currently 
payable by an investor, or impose new taxes/other fiscal rules, or lift any waiver or 
immunity from taxes that investors may enjoy at any given time. A regional comparison 
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of tax regimes shows that the main taxes and fiscal incentives applicable to the mining 
sector in Tanzania are generally comparable with those in other natural resource-rich 
African countries. Yet the problems in Tanzania are rooted in the existence of multiple 
types of “nuisance” tax (a large number of minor taxes and licensing fees) and the 
complex design of taxes coupled with a cumbersome and bureaucratic tax 
administration. These problems have placed Tanzania in an unfavorable position from 
the perspective of mining investors. The fiscal depreciation allowance for the mining 
sector in Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and South Africa is relatively generous - all of these 
countries allow for a 100 percent depreciation allowance; while others seem to be more 
conservative. Except for Ghana, all countries allow corporate losses to be carried 
forward indefinitely. Only South Africa and Tanzania impose local corporate income 
taxes. All countries of the region have a withholding tax on the distribution of dividends 
as well as distribution of branch profits. On investment incentives for the mining sector 
in the region, all countries in the region provide fiscal incentives to get investment in the 
mining sector. The depreciation allowance in Botswana is less generous; the mining 
capital expenditure allowance has a linear depreciation over the life-time of a mine, and 
a full deduction is allowed only when it comes to the costs of purchasing prospecting 
information. On the fiscal regime from a regional perspective we can see that the major 
taxes and incentives applied to the mining sector in Tanzania are comparable to, if not 
more generous than, other countries (Professor Semboja: Research Bureau University 
of Dar Es salaam), (Lissu T, In God We Trust: The Political Economy of Law, Human 
Rights and Environment in Tanzania’s Mining Industry, 14 December 2001). 
   
Investment Act, 1997 
The Tanzania Investment Act of 1997 fiscal package needs to be reviewed and 
amended to reflect realities on the ground. This will include the ability of government 
agencies to oversee the mining sector. Issues needing review include a fiscal package 
that is too generous to investors, especially seeing that Tanzania gets no share from 
most projects – so that revenue from royalties and other taxes is the only source of 
income from the mining sector (though this is not collected in correct ways).  
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Financial Laws 
The most important piece of fiscal legislation which protects foreign investors in the 
mining sector from tax payment is the Financial Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 
of 1997. Experts, including LEAT, say the provision has implemented almost all of the 
conditions that the World Bank had demanded of African governments in both its 1989 
prognosis and the 1992 Strategy for African Mining technical paper. This was done by 
way of wide-ranging amendments of taxation laws enacted in the early 1970s to 
remove or significantly reduce the tax liability of investors in the mining sector. 
 
The Mining Act 1998 
The Mining Act of 1998 has to be amended with a view to making sure that 
exclusive rights to the ownership of mining sites bring about expected results. It needs 
to ensure that an ability to dispose of ownership or transfer mineral rights is made use 
of without detrimental loss of government earnings. This should curb on-going waves 
whereby some firms are no longer actual investors, but are land brokers.  
  
Observing Human Rights 
The new Mining Policy of 1998 should include rights of individuals to possess their 
traditional lands. The policy should give special treatment to the people who own plots 
of land that have minerals. The objective should be to encourage such persons to 
participate in the industry by using their plots to secure loans or to form joint ventures 
with incoming investors - though they will need guidance. This will serve to deal with 
ongoing eviction concerns and encourage compensation payments should there be 
relocations. 
 
The Empowerment of NSAs  
Although not directly linked to mining, NSAs can play a positive role in monitoring 
operations. The empowerment of non-state actors (NSAs) should be part and parcel of 
campaigns to address the sector’s problems. Some of the revenues gained from the 
mining sector should be invested in human development and in NSA capacity-building. 
Civil society in Tanzania is still weak and disorganized, and persons are not able to 
monitor resource mismanagement issues or take government officials to task. So NSAs 
should be strengthened and involved in decision- making.  
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Easy Access to Information 
Gaining access to information is a near-impossibility in Tanzania. Although the 
Constitution contains favorable language pertaining to the right of access to 
information, the National Security Act and the Tanzania Newspapers Act do not 
support such a right of access. The creation and sharing of documents is considered 
seditious at times. Public officials cannot release information unless they do so with 
special permission. The media's ability to monitor government activities has been hurt 
by a condition arrived at via the sudden growth of the industry, which has gone hand in 
hand with insufficient knowledge and facilities; for disclosure of information on what 
mining firms are paying and how revenue is spent is very important. 
  
Giving More Powers to Anti-Corruption Bodies 
The Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) has to be given powers by amending its 
Act Cap 329, which prevents the agency from carrying out its obligations; and it also 
needs capacity building. Attempts to end corruption, since 1995, have included steps 
taken via the Presidential Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption that requires all 
political leaders to declare their assets, where public servants who are supposed to be 
corrupt will be fired, and where the PCB is strengthened. A Cabinet position - Minister 
of State for Governance in the President’s office - was also created for 1995-2005, 
where such a minister was given, among others, responsibility for fighting corruption. 
These initiatives have not, however, produced the expected results.   
 
Anti-corruption laws in Tanzania are governed by the Prevention of Corruption Act 
Cap 329. The law’s hitch (for it was poorly designed) is that the establishment of the 
PCB has sections that make the fight against corruption difficult. Section 19 of the Act, 
for instance, provides, inter alia, that prosecution of a public officer charged with 
corruption is only effective after receiving the written consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP). This might not easily happen, or written consent may be difficult to 
acquire (etc.). The PCB, as an agency, is assigned to investigate acts of corruption, 
and thereafter to submit investigations and evidence gathered to the DPP for a 
decision as regards whether or not to prosecute suspects – which ‘timidity’ makes 
people refer to the PCB a ‘toothless’ agency (especially when it may expose wrong-
doing in the higher eschelons of government). The Leadership Code of Ethics, 
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Amendment Act 2001, allows or compels leaders to declare their wealth and state how 
they obtained it - yet this same code does not compel leaders when they leave office to 
declare their wealth to make a before-and-after comparison possible; so there is a 
need for revision on this score. 
   
An Independent and Fair Judiciary System 
The judicial system should be free and fair and beyond corruption. According to the 
PCB study on the Incidences and Effects of Corruption in the Judiciary for 2005, courts 
are notorious in terms of corruption. As regards the prevalence of corruption in the 
judiciary, 96.5 percent of the total number of persons interviewed in four regions of 
Tanzania said that corruption is ‘rampant’ in the country’s judiciary. Even at the filing 
stage, court clerks ask people for bribes – and failure to give a bribe may have negative 
consequences. At the hearing stage, court corruption may manifest itself via delays in 
setting hearing dates, vague or contradictory orders, unnecessary adjustments in 
‘hearing’ dates, magistrates’ or judges absconding on specified dates, hidden or 
misplaced files and/or court proceedings going unrecorded. With the verdict stage, the 
study revealed that corruption manifests itself via partiality being shown on technical 
grounds, partiality via vague interpretations of the law and via delays in passing 
sentence. Poor remuneration of judicial personnel is one reason for such corruption – 
for a resident magistrate’s (as of 2003) salary here, according to the study, is no more 
than Tshs 100,000 (equivalent to about US$100), without benefits (see PCB Report on 
the Judiciary and Incidence of Corruption 2005). Past experience shows that it is 
difficult to win a case in court, including ones related to mining issues. (One case in 
point here is the case involving Small Miners and AFGEM, which was thrown out on 
technical grounds, without consideration of its main cause.) 
   
Integrating EITI Programs 
Tanzania needs to get Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
membership. EITI is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, 
investors and international organizations; and it supports improved governance in 
resource-rich countries via the full publication and verification of any company 
payments and government revenues obtained from resources like mining. By 
implementing EITI programs, it will be possible for people to get to know what the 
government receives and what mining companies’ pay – and this is a critical first step 
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towards holding decision-makers responsible for revenues and for the openness of 
contracts being signed (www.eitiolso.no). 
  
Minimizing Donor Dependence 
So as to avoid the over-influence of donors in the mining sector, Tanzania needs to 
avoid having any outside dependencies that might affect the shaping of policies 
imposed as conditions via which one obtains a loan. This does not mean that donors 
are useless - the argument is that the relevancy of policies needs to be looked at. In 
1997, Tanzania adopted a new National Mining Policy (NMP). According to the Law 
Reform Commission, the NMP was adopted with the guidance of and fiscal support 
from the World Bank - where its sole objective was to place the mining sector in the 
hands of international capital. According to the Bank, the NMP was to eliminate the risk 
of possible interest being shown by the government in the future as regards having an 
expanded role in mining. The NMP accomplished this by restricting the role of the 
government and by divesting the subsidiaries owned and operated by the State Mining 
Corporation (STAMICO) to the private sector. According to Canadian diplomats who 
closely followed these developments on behalf of Canadian mining interests, the Bank 
financed the British and Tanzanian consultants who drafted the new Mining Act 
enacted into law in 1998. The British consultants hired by the Bank for this purpose 
worked for Transborder Investment Advisory Services Ltd., an investment firm from the 
City of London. (A conducive environment for whose benefit: LEAT).  
 
Discretionary Powers vested in the Minister 
Discretionary powers given to the minerals’ minister should be checked, for abuses 
may occur here. Current rules and policies governing the sector create room for a 
minister to abuse his powers. He is, of course, ‘above’ Parliament. The minerals’ 
minister is given wide discretionary powers to enter into ‘development agreements’ with 
investors in relation to the financing of mining operations under a special mining 
license. Such agreements may “contain provisions binding the United Republic of 
Tanzania, which will guarantee the fiscal stability of a long-term mining project with 
regard to the range and applicable rates of royalties, taxes, duties, fees and other fiscal 
imposts and the manner in which liability in respect thereof is calculated”. The Act lays 
down the amount of royalty on the net back value of minerals, and the government 
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receives 5 percent in the case of diamonds and 3 percent in the case of other minerals 
from foreign investors; and, via section 87 of the Mining Act, the minister is obliged to 
defer payment of even this meagre amount upon application by the investor that “the 
cash operating margin” of his operations has fallen below zero.   
  
Further shielding foreign investors from local or national scrutiny is the fact that the 
powers of local and national institutions to deal with possible disputes between the 
government and investors are taken away; and by giving the Commissioner of Minerals 
powers to decide upon disputes between investors and local communities investors are 
protected from having their operations challenged in courts of law by local 
communities. Although the Act does provide for mandatory requirements – e.g. an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) and environmental management plans (EMPs) 
for almost all mining undertakings - there are significant loopholes. For example, the 
minister may exempt, in terms of section 64(2), an applicant from needing a gemstone 
mining license from the mandatory requirements to commission and produce an EIA or 
EMP.  
 
In addition, the minister may enter into a development agreement (which is not 
inconsistent with the Mining Act 1998) for the purpose of granting a prospecting or 
mining license in order to define terms and conditions to be included in the license. An 
agreement should be made with the lawful occupiers of land and their written consent 
should be obtained if mining or a prospecting operation requiring a special mining 
license or the financing of any mining operations are to occur. The agreement 
guarantees the fiscal stability of any long-term mining project, therefore – which, again, 
may well tempt a minister to abuse his powers if there are no controls. 
    
Re-organizing the Industry 
Based on the fact that the mining sector is not well organized, especially as regards 
small miners, it then follows that it should be regulated. Helping small miners in terms 
of affordable technology and capital is essential; in addition, the government should 
also provide services to dealers, including the creation of a centre where they can get 
information on, among other things, markets and prices – for reliable markets for 
gemstones are needed. Good governance should also ensure that handling the mining 
sector includes doing away with ‘red-tape’ and reducing nuisance taxes (which 
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increases production costs). Government official capacity-building so as to monitor the 
industry is a prerequisite in Tanzania, too - which should go hand in hand with other 
strategies to increase transparency and accountability. Tanzania should implement the 
Tucson Tanzanite Protocol – and have one ‘brand’ of Tanzanite, which will require the 
processing of Tanzanite within the country.  
7.3 Adopting Protocols and Internationally Acceptable Standards With 
Regard to FDI  
Following on from a comparative study called “African Mining Codes Questioned”, 
GRAMA, the group of researchers who did the research, came to useful conclusions 
with regard to the managing of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in mining. To address 
the problem of tax evasion and market power abuses, Protocols and Internationally 
Acceptable Standards (APIA) are to be recommended as one aspect of handling FDI. 
Below, is a list of proposed measures for the government: 
• Adopting a protocol on the conduct of business based on the Draft Fundamental 
Human Rights Principles for Business Enterprises. These principles were drawn 
up by the United Nations Commission on the Promotion of Human Rights – and 
they should be strengthened further by the addition of an independent monitoring 
body, and there also need to be rules of enforcement. 
• Implementation of the Organization of Economic and Development’s Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises while ensuring that the designated National Contact 
Points are given greater prominence; powers for monitoring and enforcement 
need to be delineated also. A company’s willingness to implement OECD 
guidelines could become a condition of eligibility for all northern government 
guarantees and export credits.  
• Holding dialogues with countries that are home to mining companies that operate 
in Tanzania, so that such countries agree to develop guidelines pertaining to 
corporate social responsibility. These would make reference to established 
indices of corporate social responsibility, such as those laid out in the OECD’s 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. For these to be effective, there needs to 
be put in place mechanisms to ensure the monitoring and enforcement of such 
guidelines.  
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• Making sure that stock exchanges in the countries where mining companies are 
registered possess corporate social responsibility disclosure requirements 
modelled on corporate governance guidelines. As part of their listing 
requirements, companies would be required to disclose, in their annual reports, 
their approach to corporate social responsibility - and to explain away any 
discrepancies. Any form of public support should be based on a company’s 
capacity to demonstrate its strict adherence to corporate social responsibilities. 
• Discussions need to take place with the country of origin of mining companies 
operating in Tanzania to ensure compliance with acceptable standards. Such 
practices are now being implemented in several countries - and are 
recommended under the 1998 European Union guidelines for European 
enterprises operating in developing countries.  
Ultimately, however, responsibility for defining, monitoring and enforcing standards 
must rest with Tanzania - and to attain successful results, there is a need to have 
effective, honest governance.  
7.4 A Need to Have and Have Strengthened a National Governance and 
Integrity System  
Corruption has undermined democracy, weakened the performance of public 
institutions and has hindered the optimal use of resources in Tanzania – so needs to 
be dealt with; but to get an understanding of things as they exist, while seeing previous 
measures taken to deal with it - and why they failed - is a first step. 
7.4.1 Past Anti-corruption Initiatives   
Many anti-corruption strategies have failed in Tanzania partly because they have 
been too narrowly focused or were not grounded in reality/lacked practicability. 
Strategies included the setting-up the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) in 1991 
and the formation of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics in 1995 - to curb 
improprieties at higher levels of public service; while in 1996 the government 
established the Permanent Commission of Integrity (Ombudsman) to oversee abuses 
of power by government officials and its agencies. This was followed by the formation 
of the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance in 2001. 
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These were initiatives taken by retired President Benjamin Mkapa, who came to 
power in 1995. In January 1996, he established the Presidential Commission of Inquiry 
Against Corruption, commonly referred to as the Warioba Commission. The 
Commission produced one of the most respected and commended analyses of 
corruption; and its report concluded that there was much evidence of corruption - and it 
classified the evil into two categories, namely ‘petty’ and ‘grand’ corruption. It was that 
report which led the president to appoint a good governance minister, who is 
responsible for, among other things, monitoring overall strategy and the implementation 
of anti-corruption measures. He also prepared and adopted the Natural Anti-Corruption 
Strategy for Tanzania, focusing on the need for transparency and accountability in 
government. It was also due to the Warioba report that the president was prompted to 
establish the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB), a unit that investigates and 
prosecutes corruption, with the approval of the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP). 
The government did not end its work there, though – for one other reform measure was 
the launching of the National Framework on Good Governance (NFGG), in December 
1999, with its emphasis on Accountability, Transparency and Integrity (ATIP).  
7.4.2 Reasons for the PCB’s Failure   
Despite the above measures, reports of corruption continue to unfold in the news 
media on a daily basis, thereby demonstrating that corruption is not exclusively, or 
even primarily, a problem emanating from one, single institution. The PCB lists about 
nine causes of corruption in Tanzania, three of which refer to poor governance. They 
include (i) a legal and administrative/political framework that provides an atmosphere 
conducive to the existence of corruption, (ii) a lack of transparency or accountability in 
the executing of decisions and (iii) a lack of political will. According to the PCB, grand 
corruption involves high-level leaders and public servants seeking greater wealth 
accumulation; and such persons make use of a variety of tactics attain their corrupt 
ends - about which the PCB had this to say: 
• Leaders who are supposed to make important national decisions are bribed for 
them to make a decision that is in the interests of the briber. They are offered 
chairmanships and directorships of boards of parastals without taking into 
account professional knowledge, ability or the national interest – in this way, 
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executive decisions relating to the allocation of “hunting blocks” or allocations of 
plots in areas not permitted by law are skewed to benefit specific persons.  
• Chief executive officers receive bribes in order to breach tendering rules and 
regulations, to make various tax exemptions and to conclude construction 
contracts with private companies without due regard being given to the national 
interest; and they themselves obtain specific positions.  
• Politicians bribe members of executive committees within political parties - or 
voters during elections - to vote for them or their own candidates.  
• MPs offer bribes to voters so that they elect them, make fake claims in their 
parliamentary activities logbooks, give bribes to reporters so that they publish 
good stories about their activities and demand gifts of private/parastatal 
companies when they go to visit them.? 
7.4.3 Reasons for the Failures of the Presidential Commission  
The Report on the State of Corruption in Tanzania (PUBD.121996.001 COR) 
coming from the Presidential Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption has similar 
observations regarding corruption in Tanzania. The commission also uncovered ‘petty’ 
and ‘grand’ corruption - where grand corruption involves high-level officials and public 
servants, who pay no heed to anti-corruption strategies; so the group enjoys immunity 
from the top. As to how they actually manipulate the system, the commission says that 
leaders who are supposed to make important national decisions are bribed by 
businessmen to get decisions in their own interests; and there are cases pointing to the 
involvement of ex-ambassadors and retired government officials in the world of 
business - including retired government intelligence officers who work as directors for 
private firms, some of which are mining firms. Showing how top leaders may well be 
the ‘stumbling block’ here, the commission had this to say: “It has become evident that 
the greatest source of corruption in the country is neither the poor economy nor low 
salaries, although these too have played their part... The greatest source is the 
lackadaisical leadership overseeing the implementation of the established norms. The 
absence of clear guidelines on the accountability of leaders in their respective positions 
- be it in political leadership or senior administrative or management positions - is part 
of the weakness.”  
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7.4.4 New Anti-corruption Strategies by the Fourth-phase Government  
Coming into office in 2005, the new government of President Jakaya Kikwete has 
also come-up with measures to try to organize the country. These include an intention 
to re-negotiate mining contracts with major companies, whose aims would be to amend 
controversial clauses in mining contracts, especially those that give tax and fee-
exemptions to investors. The Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) has now been re-
named the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), with extra-powers 
of course, including ones allowing them to seize assets should this be required. 
Furthermore, reports from the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) are now being 
discussed in Parliament. From the experts’ point of view, this is a good start – they do 
admit, however, that the road will be a hard one; for reform is merely pending or is 
incomplete in many cases, for example: 
• The new anti-corruption bureau is still controlled by the state, which means the 
body lacks autonomy, including having powers to deal with ‘grand’/political 
corruption.  
• Section 19 of the PCB Act, declaring that prosecuting a public officer charged with 
corruption is only effective with the written consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP), has not been amended.  
• The New PCB Act has neglected international conventions against corruption - 
like the African Union Convention of 2003 and the SADC Protocol Against 
Corruption Convention of 2002.  
• Major contracts remain secret after refusal by the Ministry of State for Good 
Governance in the president’s office to reveal them to respective parliamentary 
committees or make them available to the general public. 
• The Information Act still restricts the media and the public. 
• Political corruption has not been attended to in the recent piecemeal reform 
program coming from the fourth-phase government.  
 
Elections do not fare much better in Tanzania. Corruption was especially rampant 
during the 2005 campaign, when the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) reportedly 
distributed cash, mobile phones and other ‘rewards’/incentives to voters. Also 
disturbing is when state power incumbents use political corruption to help keep the 
ruling party in power (see Global Integrity Report (2006) for Tanzania); worse still, 
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though, is that whoever assumes office then has to fit in with a system that keeps the 
corruption ball rolling (see Corruption Forum on the state of Corruption in Tanzania). 
 
Political corruption, in which public resources are diverted for purposes of patronage 
and cronyism, cannot be addressed directly without involving a holistic approach - 
otherwise, it will be difficult to find technical solutions or to see any lasting impact in 
relation to the issue. In Tanzania, political corruption not only leads to a misallocation of 
resources - it also de-rails the means via which decisions are made. As regards 
external interests, the private sector and others with vested interests can, as seen, 
‘bend’ laws, etc., no doubt making direct use of politicians and bureaucrats. And it is 
the executive – those who rule the country – who are most responsible; and anti-
corruption efforts may fail as the executive group wishes to live in two worlds - of the 
public and private sectors, i.e. they make use of the public sector to handle their own 
private interests (as we have seen occur on innumerable occasions with the Tanzanite 
industry). Anti-corruption reforms in Tanzania have been overlooking those at the top 
by focusing more on lesser law-breakers. The placing of the PCB in the president’s 
office - instead of making it responsible to Parliament - makes it impossible for the 
agency to fight bigger corruption, especially involving the executive. Despite advances 
made by the public and MPs to make the PCB an autonomous body, the government is 
not willing to do this – and not carry out more sweeping reform generally - and this 
policy paper wishes to see the creating of a nationally-coherent ‘integrity system’ as a 
holistic measure to curb poor governance and promote national integrity across both 
public and private institutions.  
 
Basic concepts and foundations of an integrity system have to be clearly 
understood. It is equally important that resulting solutions be grounded in reality and 
practicality. More than this, solutions must relate to other parts of the system overall. 
The goal should be to establish a National Integrity System to make corruption a high-
risk and low-return undertaking. Indeed, the system proposed here should be designed 
to prevent corruption from occurring in the first place rather than relying on issuing 
penalties after it has taken place. 
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CHAPTER 8 
8.1 A Proposed and Coherent National Integrity System  
Integrity means adherence to a set of moral or ethical principles. An integrity 
system, therefore, is a political and administrative arrangement that encourages good 
governance. A country’s national integrity comprises all government and non-
government institutions, laws and practices that can, when functioning properly, 
minimize levels of corruption and the mismanagement of resources. A national integrity 
system, promoted by an assortment of institutions, should be effective in its anti-
corruption drive – and it must take on board key ‘pillars’. In the case of Tanzania, pillars 
to be included in the integrity building agenda could include the following: 
 
The Legislature 
The current situation, where the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) holds a 
dominant majority in Parliament, and with the exercising of its discipline and solidarity 
well established, there is little chance for the legislature to take the executive to 
account. There is evidence that CCM MPs normally meet separately to make their ‘own 
stand’ if there is to be a major debate in the assembly, a tendency which affects 
decisions made in the House. The Prime Minister, who is the government business 
leader in Parliament, is very powerful in influencing any motion - and in so doing, 
affects the effectiveness of MPs when they seek to take ministers to task. 
   
Measures and reforms might include an opening-up to new voices in Parliament 
and local governments, and the strengthening of opposition parties. Independent 
candidates should be allowed to stand, initially for local government elections, to see a 
strengthening of parliamentary committees - and where they can gain access to all 
government documents, including contracts, prior to signing them – relating to 
potentially corrupt bodes. An area that needs special attention is the ‘oversight’ one - to 
keep an eye on the executive, so holding the executive to account on behalf of the 
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citizen; and it is important to have a mechanism which checks political corruption, 
especially during elections. 
     
The Executive 
The executive, operating via the president and cabinet, dominates national policy 
and decision-making processes. A strong executive can override legislatures’ 
mandates to exercise control and oversight – and this needs to be overhauled. What 
needs to be looked at are the discretionary powers of the executive and the 
corresponding opportunities to abuse one’s powers. Constitutional immunity granted to 
the president should be subject to discussion and scrutiny. Strengthening and 
formalizing the rules controlling ministerial and presidential powers so as to safeguard 
the independence of the judiciary and the civil service is also a prerequisite in this 
proposed reform. Also to be included is the reviewing and enforcing of appropriate 
conflict-of-interest regulations. Transparency mechanisms that lift the immunity that 
executives and high public officials enjoy by reason of their office should be integrated 
equally into a reform of enforcement measures. It is important, too, to review the 
current Constitution, which gives too much immunity to the President of Tanzania, 
especially immunity from criminal and civil proceedings (Act no. 15, of 1984). Article 46 
(1) of the Constitution says that ‘During the President’s tenure of office, in accordance 
with this Constitution, it shall be prohibited to institute or continue in court any criminal 
proceedings whatsoever against him.’ The same Article, in part 2, says that ‘During the 
President’s tenure of office, in accordance with this Constitution, no civil proceedings 
against him shall be instituted in court in respect of anything done or not done, or 
purporting to have been done or not done, by him in a personal capacity as an ordinary 
citizen whether before or after assuming the office of President.’ Furthermore, reforms 
should be made to address the laws on Ethics for Public Leaders - as the currently 
existing code, according to the Commission Report referring to the State of Corruption 
in Tanzania, have the following deficiencies: 
 
a) It does not specify all the ethical standards that should be adhered to 
b) It involves the President in the evolving of ethical standards 
c) It provides for a very lengthy process of inquiry into indictments 
d) It provides a loophole via which one might conceal illegal income by 
differentiating between declared and non-declared assets 
e) It does not give explicit powers to the Ethics Commissioner 
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f) It does not specify the penalties to be imposed on those who breach the ethics 
code.      
 
It is also proposed that presidential appointees should be reduced if related to 
‘sensitive’ posts – e.g. with the Controller and Auditor General (CAG), the Prevention of 
Corruption Bureau (PCB) and, of course, Regional and District Commissioners. 
     
The Judiciary 
The judiciary’s leadership must become a key aspect of the coalition for change and 
should make the necessary changes to their own practices. For this to be done, the 
judiciary should be free from executive influence and abstain from corruption. 
     
The Controller and Auditor General  
The Auditor General’s office in Tanzania has been very active of recent in 
producing reports on time - and its role is commendable. The report is now being 
discussed in Parliament and by other government bodies - though the report must be 
given widespread publicity, and the government should act to implement the 
recommendations given therein. 
    
Ombudsman 
One is in place in Tanzania, but what is needed is that administrative accountability 
is introduced here. He should operate independently of the government, and have a 
high level of public trust and a good profile; and he should be constantly looking into 
and reviewing declarations of income and assets made by senior officials. While all 
information must be made available to the public. 
  
Watchdog Agencies 
It is proposed that office-holders in the anti-corruption bureau should be appointed 
in such a way that the independence of the country’s rulers is ensured; and prosecution 
law should be such that the bureau can take any culprit to task (otherwise it risks 
becoming a force of repression in its own right). The PCB has failed to a great extent 
largely because of its lack of independence, and this denial of powers has prevented it 
from being able to charge persons with felonies. Civil penalties, a black-listing of 
corrupt firms, extradition arrangements and other legal provisions – ones which enable 
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the profits of the corrupt to be seized and forfeited, both inside and outside the country 
- would all be powerful disincentives to potential wrong-doers. It is important to create 
‘room’ for independent investigators in such a manner that they perform their 
professional duties transparently and in an independent fashion - and enforce the rule 
of law. Assets declarations by all office holders and elected persons need to be 
incorporated into such anti-corruption laws. The PCB should also be involved in 
monitoring the lifestyles of public decision-makers and public service officials. 
  
Public Service  
Existing public service ethics need to be reviewed and enforced. The government 
must ensure that salaries of civil servants and political leaders are suitable in that they 
reflect the responsibilities of their posts and are comparable with those in the private 
sector.  
  
The Media 
The legal and administrative environment should provide for a free press. Press 
reform should be aided by several measures, such as with there being freedom of 
information – all persons, including journalists, must easily have access to government 
or private sector information. A repeal or revision of anti-defamation laws and insult 
laws is needed to ensure that these cannot be used to threaten or fetter the press. 
Ending press and media censorship, raising the professional standards of journalism 
and ending government discrimination (such as controlled access to newsprint, 
advertising) against certain media should also be on the reform agenda. And 
journalism associations possessing anti-corruption programs should be supported. 
There should also be a form of training on how to actually do good reporting. There 
could be the establishment of a specialized publication dealing with the “resource 
curse” looking at poor governance and educating the public on such issues. There 
needs to be an empowerment of journalists and journalism. 
   
Civil Society 
Civil society should be able to be a part of policy-making. It should have freedom of 
speech, while capacity-building and coalitions within itself are required. People might 
initiate public awareness campaigns to look at abnormalities in the mining industry, to 
develop anti-resource curse strategies and organize meetings with decision-makers in 
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the government and with donors. There should also be organized public consultation 
workshops to seek citizens’ consensus with regard to approaches that need to be 
taken to address problems. 
   
The Private Sector 
Anti-corruption initiatives must be promoted in the private sector, too, and could 
include corporate good-governance programs. The private sector, as with civil society, 
has a role to play in monitoring the implementation of the National Anti-corruption 
Strategy and Action Plans (NACSAP). Mining companies should refrain from corrupt 
practices and from giving bribes – and should direct funds towards community-based 
development projects, pay their taxes and always pay compensation to relocated 
people. 
 
International Actors 
Outside pressure may be helpful in encouraging internal debate and building 
coalitions for reform in Tanzania. As regards loans coming from international financial 
institutions, many need to ‘force’ the release of information that has previously been 
kept secret by officials - so the resource ‘curse’ should be dealt with and desired 
conditions arrived at before loans/grants are again offered to outsiders. For MIGA, it is 
important that mining companies seeking guarantees publish what they pay to the 
government (taxes, fees, royalties, and other payments). MIGA also needs to have 
access to production-sharing agreements and other contracts vital to the tracking of 
revenue streams. Importers of Tanzanite, which include countries like USA, India, 
Kenya and South Africa, should be ready to cooperate with Tanzania to deal with illegal 
Tanzanite dealers; for there should be a proper scrutiny of businessmen and traders. 
Vested interests had by international actors need to be monitored, especially when it 
comes to FDI, where moves made beforehand - and not after a deal has been made - 
are more important.  
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CHAPTER 9 
9.1 Lessons Learned from Botswana’s Experience  
Botswana is a typical example of a country that has abundant natural resources. 
Although it is commonly accepted that resource-rich countries may fail to increase 
growth potentials, this has not been the case with Botswana - for Botswana has 
experienced the most remarkable economic performance in the sub-Sahara region. 
From being one of the world’s poorest countries when it gained independence in 1966, 
with a per capita income of less than $100, Botswana today has a per capita income 
that exceeds $3,500. Diamond revenues, channeled via the lucrative partnership 
between the Botswana government and diamond giant De-Beers, known as 
Debswana, has transformed the country from one with only 6km of asphalted roads at 
the time of independence to a country with some 6,000km of asphalted roads today. 
Health facilities, education, clean water and electricity are available to over 90 percent 
of the population; and literacy rates, which stood at 50 percent in the early 1970s, are 
over 80 percent today. Mining accounted for a massive 35 percent of GDP and over 80 
percent of exports in 2005.  
 
In 2004/05, Botswana’s economy grew by a healthy 8.3 percent, largely due to 
strong performances in diamond mining (the average real GDP over the past decade 
has been between 4 and 8 percent). Yet the sector only provides for 3 percent of 
formal employment. The government, on the other hand, which has richly benefited 
from diamond revenues (that make up over 60 percent of its revenue), provides 39 
percent of all formal employment in Botswana.
35
. Botswana’s ‘crucial moment’ came in 
1995, when Secretse Khama won elections – for the future of Botswana depended on 
decisions made by Khama and his administration. Unlike other African leaders, Khama 
adopted pro-market policies over a wide front. His new government promised low and 
stable taxes to mining companies, liberalized trade, increased personal freedom, and 
kept marginal income tax rates low so as to deter tax evasion and corruption. In 
addition, Khama preserved the Kgotlas (The Kgotlas were indigenous institutions—19
th
 
                                            
35
 Article published in the Business in Africa Magazine, June 2006 
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century chiefs held town meetings, with their people; these gave all adult males an 
opportunity to criticize and advise the chief) and many elements of customary law (see 
Michael Clement, Center for Global Development: How did Botswana Avoid the 
Resource Curse?).  The policies initiated by Khama, and continued thereafter, provided 
a stable environment and showed hospitality to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The 
country had a functioning democracy, encouraged freedom of thought and expression 
and is a racially tolerant society. The reason Botswana has nevertheless achieved such 
growth to date seems to be that it has sound institutions and good governance – and 
with regard to how Botswana has been successful in developing a solid institutional 
structure, IMF working paper WP/06/138 says that this is partly due to the private 
property area that Botswana modeled from its pre-colonial political institutions, to the 
‘limited’ British colonialism, the strong political leadership had since independence and 
the elite’s desire to reinforce institutions. 
 
 
Table 5: Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS), 2002 
 B L SA N SW SS LIC MEC HIC 
Voice  and 
Accountability 
 
0.7 0.53 0.66 0.75 0.28 0.42 0.38 0.57 0.82 
Government 
effectiveness 
0.78 0.57 0.69 0.52 0.64 0.45 0.40 0.59 0.82 
Quality of 
regulations 
0.66 0.40 0.48 0.59 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.42 0.77 
Rule of Law 0.72 0.44 0.59 0.66 0.50 0.38 0.34 0.51 0.85 
Control of 
Corruption 
0.62 0.39 0.47 0.51 0.36 0.29 0.25 0.39 0.76 
Source: IMF Working Paper June 2006 
 
B=Botswana; L=Lesotho; SA=South Africa; N =Namibia; SW=Swaziland; SS=Sub 
Sahara; LIC=Low Income Countries; HIC=High Income Countries  
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According to the Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS) 
database as developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003), Botswana enjoys 
relatively good governance by regional and global standards. The GRICS indices cover 
six dimensions of governance: Voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law and control of corruption.
36
 Four 
aspects of governance seem to be particularly important in connection with natural 
resource management. 
 
First, voice and accountability, measured via the political process, and also civil 
liberties and political rights – which indicate an ability to discipline those in authority 
when it comes to resource extraction issues. Botswana has done particularly well in 
this aspect of governance. International observers praised as free and fair the 2004 
national elections; and this is quite different to the prevailing situation in Tanzania, 
where any ability to discipline the authorities as regards resource extraction is almost 
non-existent. Secondly, it refers to government effectiveness in Botswana, as 
measured by the quality of public services and the competence of civil servants. 
Botswana’s use of mineral revenue has kept an eye on an implicit self-disciplining rule - 
the sustainable budget index – and any mineral revenue is supposed to finance 
investment expenditure defined as development expenditure and ensure spending on 
education and health - this is contrast with Tanzania, where all mineral revenues go 
into the general budget. 
 
Thirdly, natural resource development must involve a long-term relationship with all 
private parties, while market-friendly policies like price controls and excessive 
regulatory burdens are undesirable here. Normally, contracts related to natural 
resources commonly run for more than 10 years. The term for diamond-mining leases 
in Botswana is 25 years. The quality of Botswana’s regulations is generally acceptable. 
In the mining sector, the government of Botswana holds 50 percent of shares in 
Debswana, the largest diamond company in the country; and the Ministry of Minerals 
and Water Resources has direct responsibility for natural resource regulation and 
management generally. In Tanzania, the government has opted not to hold shares in 
mining projects, though it has provided many incentives under the fiscal stability 
                                            
36
 IMF working paper; WP/06/138 June 2006 
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package and via special agreements that the Minerals’ ministers arrive at with mining 
companies. Thus, the government there does not hold shares in mining firms, and fails 
to collect taxes; while there is the fact, too, that local investors lack the capital to be 
able to take advantage of potential business.  
 
Finally, anti-corruption policies are essential to a fair and transparent distribution of 
resource benefits. In Botswana, corruption in the public sector is not a serious problem. 
The budgetary and procurement process is relatively transparent. An independent anti-
corruption authority - the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crimes, established 
in 1994 - has the authority to report corruption cases directly to the president. The 
Constitution also makes the Attorney-general independent of the government. This 
anti-corruption framework is conducive to successful resource management in 
Botswana. (Did Botswana Escape the Resource Curse? (IMF Working Paper: 
WP/06/138 June 2006). In Tanzania, however, the anti-corruption body lacks authority.  
 
If Tanzania wants to replicate Botswana’s experience, therefore, the starting point 
should be to bring into effect good governance policies.      
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CHAPTER 10 
10.1 An Agenda for Change   
This policy paper intends to point the way to good governance and an ending of the 
“resource curse” in Tanzania. It has taken a look at program reforms, how government 
works and is organized, existing rules, institutional building and more. What one has to 
do is to launch an agenda for change, however. One way to begin this is via the 
establishing of two bodies, namely (A) a Mining Review Independent Committee and 
(B) a National Integrity Working Group, which will bring together all stakeholders within 
government (the executive, public officials, anti-corruption bodies, the judiciary, 
parliamentary committees etc.) along with coalition partners from outside government 
(from civil society and the private sector, religious leaders, professional bodies, and 
international actors).  
 
Committee A should concentrate on two areas: 
• Review Policies and Regulations (RPR), things which affect the Tanzanite 
industry, the mining sector and investments in general. 
• Review Protocols and Internationally Acceptable Standards (APIAS), to help 
handle and monitor Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the most equitable and 
effective way.  
while Committee B should concentrate on:-  
• Developing strategies for building up an effective National Governance and 
Integrity System (NGIS) 
 
These groups could: 
• Agree that poor governance is an important issue, and seek to win the support of 
all major political groupings so that work towards commonly-agreed objectives 
can begin; also, take a look at the existing framework and identify areas needing 
reform so as to develop an overall plan that has in it short-term, medium- and 
long-term goals (including a public awareness-raising program), which assigns 
responsibilities for follow-up action, and which reports back to the working group. 
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• Publicize the establishment of the working group and its overall plan - and solicit 
inputs from the wider public. Continue by seeking endorsement of the plan from 
the political leadership. 
• Hold regular meetings and give appropriate publicity to its work, paying particular 
attention to achieving public confidence. Decisions that have to be made during 
meetings will require a time framework as well as clear, effective and responsible 
implementation and monitoring/evaluation schedules 
• Post the national action plan onto a website and generate local media interest in 
covering progress made along with success stories – and there should be no self-
pitying as regards failures made. 
• As reform programs involve a range of actors, the government needs to appoint 
an influential minister so that there is a political figure who is clearly responsible 
and who is well placed to keep an eye on the variety of issues being discussed. 
• Work to generate both top-down and bottom-up pressure related to corruption 
and its workings, both within and outside the public sector. 
• Ensure that all involved parties appreciate that the task is long-term; and while 
there may be some quick victories (as the problem is big) we propose that the 
time framework should not be shortened. When the strategy has been fully 
developed, the government should be ready to implement it, with goodwill. But it 
should be borne in mind that results will be gradual, so reviews will have to take 
place periodically until good governance has been arrived at.   
10.2 A Fear of Vested Interests  
The task will then be how to overcome vested interests. It appears that there are 
two groups - one favoring policy change and the other resisting not only these changes 
but also holistic/integrity reform in general. Resistance might come from corrupt foreign 
mining firms and their respective diplomatic officials, from middlemen in the mining 
sector, smugglers, some figures in the executive/persons at the top of the government 
set-up and in the ruling party, retired government officials with vested interests in 
mining firms, stakeholders from the private sector, and others with vested interests 
(particularly those seeking a way in for multinationals). It might also include think-tanks, 
whose livelihood depends on envelops from corruption. Such persons are powerful and 
have resources, and they can influence the system, deciding who should be minister or 
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even a future President. While the group favoring reform is made up of the public at 
large, MPs, local investors, Civil Society, Diplomatic officials who propagate real 
democracy and good governance, International NGOs and academicians. So these are 
the two forces. As to who might win will depend on which side the President stands – 
for it the President wishes to opt for true reform, he will have to overcome three forces: 
pressure from his own ruling party and some private sector elites in, from syndicates 
sent in by external partners and, finally, from mining companies.         
10.3 Proposed Steps  
For the government: It should initiate public consultation workshops to seek a 
consensus with citizens on the most feasible approach to be taken to address the 
resource curse. It should encourage the participation of non-state actors (NSAs) in 
decision- and policy-making. Consensus meetings should be organized to draft 
strategy and the steps to be followed.  
 
For mining companies: They should seek to avoid corruption or the paying of 
bribes, and pay for community-based development projects, their taxes and 
compensation to any relocated people. They should be prepared for positive changes... 
 
For NSAs: Non-state actors should initiate public awareness campaigns to look at 
abnormalities existing in the mining industry, develop anti-resource course strategies, 
have consultations with the government and have meetings with government decision-
makers and donors. NSAs will be the entities that create a pressure for change. Yet 
they must be careful in relation to NGOs and think-tanks (which work as a form of 
public relation for donors and for irresponsible government officials).  
 
International actors: They should facilitate any positive moves made having the 
goal of good and open governance, and will have to accept that they have 
responsibilities in the country, which is the price they will have to pay for the 
opportunities they have to make profits there.  
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Conclusion 
 
This study has come to the conclusion that poor governance in the Tanzanite and in 
the mining sector at large has exposed the resource to large scale curses, including the 
Al-Qaeda link controversy, mismanagement and organised resource sabotage by 
unscrupulous dealers taking advantage of the weak system.  Poor governance has 
created room for an endless crisis in the sector and has created a lucrative 
environment for vandalism by untraceable dealers who are prone to dealing with illegal 
traders like the network of unscrupulous investors, mafia, smugglers and the like.  
Whilst it is proposed to overhaul the National Integrity System, here emphasis has 
been placed on tackling political corruption, especially within the executive department.  
Agenda for change should be the entry point in looking for ways to address the 
resource curse and to initiate holistic integrity reform.  All stakeholders should be taken 
on board as interested parties. 
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